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Adelina Iftene* Employing Older Prisoner Empirical Data
to Test a Novel s. 7 Charter Claim
This article builds the case for expanding s. 7 of the Charter of Canadian Rights
and Freedoms to apply to prison regulations and decisions in the specific context
of an aging prison population. As original empirical data shows, prisons are highly
insensitive to age-related problems, and inappropriate or insufficient medical
treatment receives official sanction from a wide range of correctional documents.
The stark inadequacies of the current system endanger older prisoners' security
of the person, and sometimes their lives, in ways that violate their rights under
s. 7, since the deprivations they suffer result from legislative policies and state
conduct that are by turn arbitrary, overbroad, and grossly disproportionate.
While s. 7 has not been used to review such administrative documents or actions
before, such a review is both feasible and highly desirable given the current lack
of substantial access to justice by prisoners, their heightened vulnerability, and
the evolution of the section 7jurisprudence.
Cet article tente d'expliquer pourquoi Particle 7 de la Charte canadienne des
droits et libertbs devrait sappliquer aux r~glements et aux decisions dans les
prisons dans le contexte particulier du vieilissement de la population carc~rale.
Comme le montrent les donndes empiriques originales, les prisons sont trbs
insensibles aux problmes lis 6 l'ge, et les traitements mddicaux inapproprids
ou insuffisants sont officiellement sanctionnds dans de nombreux documents
correctionnels. Les insuffisances flagrantes du syst~me actuel mettent en danger
la s~curit6 des d~tenus Jgs, et parfois leur vie, d'une manibre qui viole leurs
droits proteges par /'article 7, puisque les privations dont ils souffrent r~sultent
de politiques /4gislatives et d'une conduite de /'Etat qui sont 6 /a fois arbitraires,
impr~cises et grossibrement disproportionndes. Bien que Particle 7 n'ait jamais
6t6 utilis6 pour examiner de tels documents ou mesures administratives, un tel
examen est 6 /a fois faisable et hautement souhaitable 6tant donne le grave
manque actuel d'acc~s 6 /a justice pour les d~tenus, leur vulndrabilit6 accrue et
/'6volution de la jurisprudence relative 6 /'article 7.
* Adelina Iftene, PhD, Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. I am
deeply grateful to Professors Ben Berger, Jamie Cameron, Alan Young, Allan Manson, and Anthony
Doob and to Basil Alexander, who have either provided comments on previous drafts of this article
or on the study at the basis of this article. Thank you to Schulich School of Law JD student, John
MacCormick for his excellent research assistance. Any potential errors in this article are my own.
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Introduction
For a long time, prisoners were a forgotten group of people. Despite
legislation in place to ensure their rights,1 and despite the work of a number
of scholars and activists, 2 prisoners' rights have often been thought to
cease after sentencing. What happens in prisons goes on behind closed
doors with a minimum of external oversight, and so it is unsurprising that
1. Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 [CCRA]; Conditional Release
Regulations, SOR/ 96-602 [CCRR].
2. See e.g., Michael Jackson, Justice behind the Walls, (Vancouver/Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre,
2001) at 576-583. [Jackson, Justice behind the Walls]; Debra Parkes & KimPate, "Effective Oversight
of Women's Prison," (April 2006) 48:2 Can J Corr 251; Lisa Kerr, "Contesting Prison Expertise Law,"
(2014) 60:1 McGill LJ 43 [Kerr].
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Canadian prisoners have endured serious problems: mental illness goes
untreated, solitary confinement is used to excess, suicides and other deaths
are improperly investigated, and there is a general disregard for the rule
of law behind bars.
Times are changing, and we have reasons to be hopeful. The Office of
the Correctional Investigator, the ombudsman for Canada's federal prisons,
has been doing great work in identifying major correctional problems
and human rights breaches.3 The media has been paying attention, and
is rightly appalled to discover that people are dying in prison, being
beaten by correctional officers, and taking their own lives in solitary
confinement.4 The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and John
Howard Societies challenged the use of solitary confinement under s. 7, s.
12, and s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.' The BC
Supreme Court decided, in part, in favour of the complainants, heavily
relying on significant social science evidence. The Court stated that the
CCRA provisions on solitary confinement violate s. 7 because they allow
for prolonged, indefinite isolation, there is no independent review of the
decision to place individuals in segregation, and the prisoners have no right
to counsel at segregation review decisions. The provisions also violate
s. 15 because they allow for the segregation of mentally ill individuals,
and they have a discriminatory effect on Indigenous prisoners. However,
no violation of s. 12 was found.6 In Ontario, class actions have been
brought regarding the placement of young prisoners in segregation and
the frequent use of lockdowns.7 Legal Aid Ontario's Policy and Research
Department has prioritized prison law in its 2015-2019 plan, and it has
3. Howard Sapers, Office of the Correctional Investigator Annual Report 2010-2011, online:
<www.oci-bec.gc.ca> [Sapers, OCI, 2010-2011], Howard Sapers, Office of the Correctional
Investigator Annual Report 2014-2015, online: <www.oci-bec.gc.ca> [Sapers, OCI, 2014-2015].
4. Patrick White, "Keeping inmates in isolation 'not reasonable,' Alberta judge ruled," The Globe
and Mail (18 August 2016); Patrick White, "Documents reveal troubling details about long-term
solitary confinement," The Globe and Mail (24 April 2016); Patrick White, "Mother seeks justice
for son's death while in solitary confinement" The Globe and Mail (17 February 2016); Patrick
White, "Ontario government reviewing solitary confinement in prisons," The Globe and Mail (26
March 2015); Editorial, "Ban long-term solitary confinement," Toronto Star (16 May 2016); Sara
Mojtehedzadeh, "Woman who died in prison complained of being tied to her bed, advocates say,"
Toronto Star (7 July 2016); Patrick White "Inmate was justified in stabbing other prisoners, Ontario
judge says," The Globe and Mail (19 July 2016).
5. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
6. British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 BCSC 62 at
paras 160-254 [BCCLA].
7. Patrick White, "Ontario Inmates file class-action lawsuit for relentless lockdowns," The Globe
and Mail (15 August 2016); Sean Fine, "Ontario government sued for putting youth in solitary
confinement," The Globe and Mail (4 November 2015).
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been conducting consultations for prison law reform. In 2016, it also
finalized a test case strategy focused on five main points, namely access
to health care, issues related to segregation, availability of rehabilitative
programming, and constitutional challenges both to the Dangerous
Offenders provisions in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,
and to arbitrary and discriminatory law and practices which prevent the
reintegration and release into society of some prisoners.'
Meanwhile, courts are becoming comfortable with an expanded use of
the Charter. Under s. 7, courts are more willing to review matters of policy
and to intervene to correct governmental injustice. Judges have begun to
see how social science evidence can help them better understand issues
outside the courts' area of expertise,9 and they are increasingly using
empirical data to identify the systemic issues that affect claimants and to
craft appropriate remedies. It follows that this is a good moment to raise
awareness of underexplored correctional problems and to propose new
legal claims that could help to correct some of the injustices that currently
prevail in prison.
The federal correctional system (which incarcerates people sentenced
to over two years in prison) currently houses about 15,000 individuals
across the country.10 In 2012, 2,000 of these were people over the age of
50," double the rate from the previous decade.12 By the fall of 2015, that
number had increased to 25% of prisoners,13 despite the fact that, overall,
the general prison population has remained at a steady number." It will
likely continue to rise over the next few decades, owing to the effects
of longer sentences, the increased hurdles raised in obtaining parole, and
the aging of the baby boomers. Meanwhile, non-prisoner studies have
established that older people in general have distinct problems compared
to younger individuals, that older people have significantly more illnesses,
and that they are affected more seriously even by those illnesses that occur
8. Legal Aid Ontario, LAO's Prison Law Test Case Strategy, online: <http://www.legalaid.onca/
en/info/testcases-prison-law.asp>.
9. See, e.g., Canada (AG) v PHS Comm Serv Soc, [2011] 3 SCR 134 [PHS]; Bedford v Canada,
2013 SCC 72 [Bedford]; Carter vAttorney General of Canada, 2015 SCC 5 [Carter]
10. Information obtained from CSC from their Offender Management Database, July 2012.
11. Sapers, OCI, 2010-2011, supra note 3 at 11.
12. Sapers, OCI, 2014-2015, supra note 3 at 10-11.
13. Ibid.
14. Cheryl Marie Webster& Anthony N Doob, "Penal Reform 'Canadian Style': Fiscal Responsibility
and Decarceration in Alberta, Canada," (2014) 16:1 Punishment & Society 3, Figure 1.
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in all age groups." Despite this reality, there has been no recent Canadian
study conducted with older prisoners that is external to the Correctional
Service of Canada [CSC], which is the managing institution for the federal
correctional system.
For these reasons, I decided to dedicate my research efforts to looking
into the challenges faced by this understudied and vulnerable group of
prisoners, and so in 2015 I concluded an empirical study with 197 older
Canadian prisoners at all levels of security in seven federal institutions
in Ontario. The findings of this study provide evidence that correctional
policies and decisions may be damaging to health, and sometimes even
life-threatening, when applied to older prisoners with their heightened
needs. Further, as I reviewed the remedial mechanisms prisoners have to
complain about inadequate treatment, it became clear that the rights of
these individuals are often left unprotected.
Advancing the rights of older prisoners will require a holistic approach.
The democratic process needs to be involved, better legislation needs to
be passed, CSC policies need to be restructured, and prisoners' access to
legal remedial mechanisms needs to be increased. In this article, I will
only address this last issue, which I will do by building an argument that
s. 7 of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedomsl6-the right not to be
deprived of life, liberty and security of the person other than in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice-could provide the basis of a
legal challenge to some of CSC's rules and regulations as they apply to
older prisoners.
I begin by offering an overview of the challenges faced by older
incarcerated individuals as these challenges have emerged from my study. I
also provide a review of the remedial mechanisms available to incarcerated
individuals and assess their limitations. I then provide a summary of the
application of s. 7 to date, separately addressing the entitlements that it
protects, the sources of infringement that are subject to review, and the
principles of fundamental justice. Next, I apply the s. 7 framework to
the issues emerging from my study, with a view to testing its potential to
15.Christine K Cassel, Jarvey J Cohen & Eric B Larson, Geriatric medicine: An Evidence-Based
Approach (New York: Springer, 2003) at 361-365, 509, 921 [Cassel et al]; James A. Blackburn &
Catherine N Dulmus, Handbook on gerontology: evidence-based approaches to theory, practice, and
policy, 2007 (Hoboken: Wiley) [Blackburn & Dulmus]; M McKenna et al, "Assessing the burden of
disease in the United States using disability-adjusted life years," 2005 28:5 AJPM 415; FC Andrade,
"Measuring the impact of diabetes on life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy among older
adults in Mexico" (2009) Series B Journal of Gerontology 32; C Jagger et al, "The burden of diseases
on disability-free life expectancy in later life," 2007, 62 AJ Gerontology, Biological Sciences &
Medical Sciences 408.
16. Charter, supra note 5, s 7.
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advance older prisoners' rights. I conclude by arguing that while s. 7 is
by no means the only rights-conferring mechanism that will need to be
used to improve the lives of older prisoners, it is nonetheless a workable
and important one. A willingness on the part of courts to consider these
matters under the Charter would help bring visibility to incarceration
problems and give a much-needed push to extend these conversations into
the legislative and governmental arenas.
I. The issue ofsenior treatment in Canadian penitentiaries
1. Aging and the culture of correctional resistance to change
Parliament has recognized that certain groups, notably women and
Aboriginal people, constitute vulnerable prison populations,1 7 and has
acknowledged that members of these groups have specific medical and
programming needs, which must be fulfilled in order to ensure substantive
equality. However, older people are not recognized as a special-needs
population, either in the legislation, or by the CSC in its internal documents,
despite the fact that seniors are acknowledged in the community as having
significantly more health problems than younger populations. The medical
literature has also confirmed the fact that most health problems have a
higher impact on seniors than they do on younger people."
The study I concluded in 2015 involved a sample of 197 individuals
from seven federal prisons in Ontario, including minimum-, medium-, and
maximum-security institutions. The lower limit used to qualify a prisoner
as "older" was the age of 50, because prior research had established that
incarcerated individuals suffer from health problems that are typical of
non-incarcerated people who are ten to fifteen years older.1 9 I conducted
structured interviews that reviewed issues pertaining to their health
problems and the treatments available in prison, their programming needs,
their relationships, and their experiences of discipline and victimization.
Using SPSS, a software platform used for quantitative research, I
determined the percentages, frequencies, and correlations for over 70
variables regarding different problems, all of them associated with aging
in the community, as they affect this group of people. By comparing the
results with the treatment reportedly available behind bars, I concluded
that the correctional system is not prepared to deal with the heightened
17. CCRA, supra note 1, s 4(h).
18. Cassel et al, supra note 15; Blackburn & Dulmus, supra note 15; McKenna et al, supra note 15.
19. Ronald Aday, "Golden Years Behind Bars: Special Programs and Facilities for Elderly Inmates"
(1994) 58:2 Federal Probation 47 at 48; Correctional Service Canada, Older Offenders in the Custody
of the Correctional Service Canada, 2014, online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/005008-rsl4-
21-eng.shtml>.
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needs of older prisoners. In particular, the medical, mental health, social,
and disciplinary policies, as well as administrative decisions of prison
officials, are made and applied using a "one-size-fits-all" approach.
The study identified a number of issues that rendered older prisoners
highly susceptible to chronic illnesses, disability, victimization, and
isolation; at the same time, it also found that they had much shorter
records of disciplinary problems.2 0 Medical care appeared inadequate and
reportedly increased the challenges these individuals faced. The following
are some of the problems noted in the study:
* 99% of the individuals suffered from at least one chronic
condition, including arthritis, cancer, multiple sclerosis, dementia,
Lou Gehrig's disease, and the effects of stroke.
* 54% of the participants reported a physical disability.
* Over 80% of the disabled individuals reported being in chronic
pain, which is significantly more than those not reporting a
disability.
* While 50% of those reporting chronic pain mentioned taking
prescribed medication for it, only 20% said it was effective.
* The only medication available, for all types of pain, was Tylenol
3.21
* Prescribed medication needed to be picked up daily, in person,
from the infirmary. In three institutions the line formed outside,
year-round, and the older prisoners were often the last to pick it up
because younger individuals would regularly cut in line.
* Four institutions did not have a nurse on site at all times.
* Some institutions did not have appropriate infrastructure, such
as elevators, handrails, and disability-friendly washrooms or
showers.
* Only 27% of the participants mentioned receiving the medical
items they needed (i.e. an extra pillow for back pain, orthopedic
shoes, canes or walkers etc.), while only 6% had a peer caregiver
assigned.
* There was a statistically relevant connection between disability
and both peer abuse (threats, stigma, and physical abuse) and staff
abuse. The latter manifested mostly as name calling or pranks
(such as officers hiding inmates' wheelchairs or canes).
20. For the methodology used and the limitations of the study see Adelina Iftene, "The Pains of
Incarceration: Aging, Rights & Policy in Federal Penitentiaries," (2017) 59:1 Can J Corr 63 [Iftene].
21. In the community Tylenol 3 is used for mild to moderate pain, MedBroadcast, online: <http://
www.medbroadcast.com/>. In prison it was used sometimes for treating pain caused by terminal
cancer.
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* A few individuals were terminally ill.
* There were no palliative care units.
* Some institutions allowed palliative care to be administered on
an individual basis. Individuals receiving this treatment were
generally given morphine and were excused from some prison
activities, such as work and walks to the canteen. However, there
was no palliative care team available, and family visits were just
as restricted as for the general population.
* Terminally ill prisoners were housed in the same units with
everybody else.
* Regardless of how sick they were, all prisoners had to undergo the
same system to see a doctor. They had to put in a request to see
the nurse. They would be called a few days later and sometimes
sent to the doctor. After the general physician had seen them, they
were sometimes placed on a list to see a specialist. This could take
up to two years.
On the other hand, participants reported low rates of disciplinary
incidents:
* 23% reported spending time in segregation after turning 50, of
which only 20% was for violent behavior.
* Most of those reporting spending time in segregation also reported
being diagnosed with a mental illness.
* 31% reported they had been charged with a disciplinary offence,
of which only 6.5% were violent offences. Similarly, most of
those reporting being charged, also reported a mental illness.22
Based on the findings in this study, as well as the reports of the Office ofthe
Correctional Investigator (OCI), 23 it appears that there is an unaddressed
gap between the needs of older prisoners and the treatment they are
receiving.
Before this study was conducted, the first to raise concerns regarding
aging prisoners was the OCI. 24 The OCI is a governmental agency
independent of the CSC, and it makes regular assessments of how prisoners'
rights are being upheld. It has produced valuable reports regarding the
main issues that arise in prison, and it has provided guidelines that, if
22. A complete account of the findings is provided in Iftene, supra note 20 and Adelina Iftene,
"Unlocking the Doors to Canadian Older Inmate Mental Health Data: Rates & Potential Legal
Responses," (2016) 47 Intl JL & Psychiatry 36 [Iftene, "Unlocking the Doors"].
23. Sapers, OCI, 2010-2011, supra note 3; Howard Sapers, Office of the Correctional Investigator,
"Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2011-2012," online: <http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx>.[Sapers, OCI, 2011-2012].
24. Sapers, OCI, 2010-2011, ibid at 20-25.
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implemented, would bring the CSC in line with its legal obligations. The
OCI's mandate is entrenched in the Corrections and Conditional Release
Act (CCRA),2 5 which provides that the CSC has an obligation to respond to
all OCI reports.2 6 However, the CSC has not been particularly responsive
so far. For example, the reply documents are often late,2 7 and the responses
are often short and dismissive -along the lines of, "There are no funds
for that," or "We are already doing that," 2 8-and matters affecting older
prisoners are no exception.
2. Prisoners'rights in a legal vacuum
Under these circumstances, Justice Arbour's warning remains relevant:
"There is little hope that the Rule of Law will implement itself in the
correctional culture without assistance and control from the Parliament
and the courts." 29 However, rights-based legal challenges have so far been
scarce in the prison context compared to what has happened outside it,
even though it is in an all-controlling institution like a prison that rights
are most likely to be suppressed.
The majority of prison claims are required to follow the internal
institutional procedure of the Correctional Services of Canada. Like
all other correctional matters, these procedures are regulated by the
Correctional and Conditional Release Act,30 its principal regulations,31
and the Offender Complaints and Grievances Directive.3 2 Senior prisoners
may, and often do, bring their grievances before the related administrative
boards. Some of the inmates interviewed had filled out more than ten
grievances within the last few years, and they had not received a reply to
most of them. These internal procedures must be exhausted-as they are,
25. CCRA, supra note 1, ss 157-196.
26. CSC's historic passivity regarding the OCI's policy recommendations is documented by Michael
Jackson in Jackson, Justice behind the Walls, supra note 2 at 576-583.
27. For example, the CSC's reply to the Office of the Correctional Investigator Report, "Inquiry into
the Death of Ashley Smith" (2007), online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/index-eng.aspx> [OCI,
"Ashley Smith"] was issued in December 2014. Out of 104 recommendations, about 10 led to some
new developments (see the CSC reply on the Correctional Service Canada site, online: <http://www.
csc-scc.gc.ca/publications/rocidcs/grid3-eng.shtml>).
28. See, e.g., the replies to the most recent annual reports: "Response of the Correctional Service
of Canada to the Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator 2013-2014" [Response of the
CSC 2013-2014]; "Response of the Correctional Service of Canada to the Annual Report of the
Correctional Investigator 2011-2012," Correctional Service Canada, online: <http://www.csc-scc.
gc.ca/publications/index-eng.shtml> [Response of the CSC 2011-2012].
29. The Honorable Louise Arbour Commissioner, Commission ofInquiry into Certain Events at the
Prison for Women in Kingston (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 1996) at 182.
30. CCRA, supra note 1, ss 90-91.
31. CCRR, supra note 1, ss. 74-82.
32. CD 081, Offender Complaints and Grievances (2008); online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/acts-
and-regulations/005006-0001-eng.shtml>.
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for instance, when a prisoner receives a negative reply at the last level
of the grievance system-before a prisoner can have access to a judicial
review in federal court.
The shortcomings of the grievance procedure have been noted by
courts, scholars, and lawyers.3 3 In May v. Ferndale the Supreme Court
first underlined the concern that the Commissioner's policies should not
be left for review by internal boards who are actually subordinated to
the Commissioner.3 4 In the same case, the SCC allowed prisoners direct
access to court when filing a habeas corpus complaint, meaning this as a
way of boosting the remedial mechanisms available and to ensure better
protection of the remainder of the prisoners' liberty. What is more, the
CCRA and the CCRR do not set out grounds on which the grievances
may be reviewed, nor do they prescribe any remedies. Added to this is the
fact that grievance decisions are not legally enforceable, which puts the
fairness and the effectiveness of this procedure into doubt.
In the Arbour Report, moreover, the grievance system was powerfully
criticized for its inefficiency.3 5 Likewise, in its 2004-2005 report, the
OCI held that the grievance system was dysfunctional when it came to
"expeditiously resolving the grievances of the offenders especially at the
national level."3 6 The system was again criticized by the investigator in
2007 after the death of Ashley Smith in the corresponding "Report on a
Preventable Death." Ms. Smith filed seven complaints in August 2007,
some of which were answered only after her death in October 2007. In
her complaints, she asked for hygienic items, but her requests were denied
because she supposedly did not use the items appropriately.3 7 As a result
of these events, the CSC appointed Professor David Mullan to review its
grievance procedures and make recommendations for improvement. He
found that the process was egregiously lengthy and bureacucratic and that
it seldom brought a satisfactory resolution.3 8
Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that senior prisoners can
effectively assert their rights by following the path prescribed by the
grievance system. First, the very effectiveness of the procedure is still
33. For a perspective on the historic failures of the grievance system, see Jackson, Justice behind the
Walls, supra note 2 at 576-593.
34. May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 at paras 63-72 [May].
35. Arbour, supra note 29 at 150-151.
36. Howard Sapers, "Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2004-2005,"
Office of the Correctional Investigator, online: <www.oci-bec.gc.ca>. [Sapers, OCI, 2004-2005].
37. OCI, "Ashley Smith," supra note 27.
38. David Mullan, "Report of the External Review of the Correctional Services of Canada Offender
Complaints and Grievances Process," 13 July 2010; For another example of failures of the system see
Parkes & Pate, supra note 2 at 259.
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in doubt. Second, even when grievances are positively resolved, the
administrative responses do not constitute legal precedent. Thus, while
they may indirectly bring seniors' issues to the attention of officials, they
will not, by themselves, result in the implementation of more favorable
treatment for older prisoners.3 9 Third, prisoners' substantive access to
courts is severely restricted, and even when they do make it before a judge,
it has been noted that courts tend to be highly deferential to governmental
decisions when reviewing prison cases.40 Thus, while statutes like the
CCRA are "more amendable to judicial review"4 1 than Charter rights
because they contain more precise standards for the rights they purport
to guarantee, in practice this process seldom leads to success. Judicial
deference to administrative decision-makers in the prison context has
been apparent even in the post-Charter era. For example, decisions that
do not involve constitutional issues have generally been reviewed on a
reasonableness standard, which entails a high level of deference. In view
of all this, it is not surprising that the outcomes for claimants are often
negative .42
Fortunately, the requirement to exhaust internal procedures does not
apply to Charter or habeas corpus applications. 43 Given the issues with the
grievance system, the endemic problems associated with managing older
offenders, and rights violations which often rise to a high or very high
degree of seriousness, I will argue in the coming sections of this paper that
Charter challenges brought directly to court can be an important avenue
for dealing with some troubling aspects of seniors' Incarceration.
In the course of a Charter challenge, an individual claimant has to
argue that there has been a rights violation in the specific circumstances of
a particular case. The empirical data now available proves that there are
systemic issues endangering the life and security of older people, which
are a result of CSC's decisions and procedures. This will offer valuable
context to any individual case and provide courts with an opportunity
to devise remedies under s. 52 or even s. 24(1) of the Charter with the
39. Bordage v Archambault Institution, (2000) 204 FTR 133; Pinkney v Canada (Correctional
Services), 2001 FCT 1053.
40. Kerr, supra note 2 at 56-58.
41. Debra Parkes, "A Prisoners' Charter?: Reflections on Prisoner Litigation under the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms," (2007) 40 UBCL Rev 629 at 637.
42. See, e.g., Fitzgeraldv William Head Institution, [1994] BCJ No 1534 (BCSC); Legere v Canada,
(1997) 133 FTR 77 (FCTD); Harms v Canada (Correctional Service), (2000) 195 FTR 144 (FCTD);
Tehrankari v Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 38 CR (5th) 43 (FCTD); Boudreau v Canada
(Attorney General), [2000] FCJ No 2016 (FCTD); Durie v Canada (Attorney General), (2001) 201
FTR 8 (FCTD); Dupras v Kent Institution, [2001] FCJ No 968 (FCTD).
43. Johnston v Centre regional de reception, [1995] RJQ 3000; Doran v Canada (Correctional
Services) (1996), 108 FTR 93; Fortin v Donnacona Institution (1997), 153 FTR 84.
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potential to address systemic issues. As a result, a handful of successful
cases could be enough to put the system on a path to positive reform.
(Such reform would include-but would not be limited to-the abolition
of unconstitutional prison directives that contain harmful practices,
institutional changes to the infrastructure, health care services and
programming to reflect the different needs of elderly prisoners, and better
avenues for decarcerating certain older individuals.) Moreover, while only
federal courts can conduct judicial reviews of administrative decisions,
some Charter challenges are under the concurrent jurisdiction of both
superior and federal courts."4 Superior courts, which tend by their nature
to have the broadest jurisdiction on Charter matters, may thus be more
open and better suited than federal courts to deal with problems involving
prisons. After all, superior courts are the ones hearing sentencing cases and
other criminal matters, so that they have usually been exposed to issues
related to imprisonment and to the limitations people face in prisons.
I have argued elsewhere that some issues impacting the senior prison
population may give rise to a Charter challenge under s. 12 (which protects
the right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment and punishment)."
However, the success of such claims depends largely on whether courts
will be more open to applying s. 12 to conditions of imprisonment (rather
than mainly limiting it to sentences), and perhaps to lowering the "grossly
disproportionate" standard, which is arguably too high.4 6 Parkes has argued
that this test has proven difficult for prisoners to meet and that "most of
the analytical work involving prison conditions is done under s. 7."47 This
is why there is also a need to develop the protection available to prisoners
under s. 7.
3. Summary
The number of people aging in pnison is growing. These people make up a
highly vulnerable population, presenting a host of heightened physical and
mental health needs. A number of the current CSC protocols and practices
fall short of responding to these specific needs, as most services have been
44. For the jurisdiction to hear Charter challenges and the advantages of choosing a superior court
as a forum, see especially Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter ofRights and Freedoms, 2005
(Toronto: Irwin Law) [Sharpe & Roach] at 120-122; lan Greene, The Charter ofRights and Freedoms.
30+ Years of Decisions that Shape Canadian Life (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2014) at
220-225; Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 6th ed, (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at
31-37.
45. Iftene, "Unlocking the Doors," supra note 22.
46. Ibid. Consistent with this, see BCCLA, supra note 6 at para 270, where segregation was found
not to violate s 12 despite findings that it has significant negative effects on individuals.
47. Parkes, supra note 41 at 659.
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designed with a younger population in mind." To make matters worse,
when requesting accommodation or attempting to vindicate their rights,
seniors face significant difficulties in accessing administrative and legal
remedial mechanisms. Thus, empirical evidence pertaining to the realities
of aging in prisons should be used to bring to court innovative claims
that could help improve the lives of incarcerated elderly people. For this
purpose, s. 7 of the Charter may prove to be an especially useful tool.
Below I provide a brief overview of the framework currently used in a s.
7 analysis, which I then proceed to apply to specific issues related to older
prisoners.
II. Section 7: current application
1. What was it designed for?
Section 7 of the Charter guarantees that everyone has "the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."4 9 Section
7 has been described as "the 'great' legal right,""o and as "one of the most
fertile, even protean, sections of the Charter, as its very general language
made it the source for numerous constitutional claims that might be
difficult to assert under other sections of the Charter." 1
The evolution of the application of s. 7 has marked spectacular
transitions, which I will briefly summarize below. I will focus on three
distinct elements of the s. 7 analysis: the entitlements to which it applies,
the sources of deprivation that are amenable to Charter scrutiny, and the
principles of fundamental justice that need to be engaged for a successful
claim.
2. Entitlement: Life, liberty and security of the person
Numerous rights recognized under s. 7 are procedural in nature and pertain
to the realm of criminal justice, where physical liberty is threatened by the
48. This is not to say that the current services meet the needs of younger prisoners. There is a
significant body ofliterature pointing out systemic shortcomings across age groups (see, e.g., Jackson,
Justice behind Walls, supra note 2; Parkes & Pate, supra note 2, etc.). However, older people have
elevated needs because of their added age-related predisposition to disease and disability, and
their particular needs have yet to enter discussions around correctional reforms. Because of these
differences, the already problematic correctional environment may be even more strenuous for older
bodies.
49. Charter, supra note 15, s 7.
50. Benjamin L Berger & James Stribopoulos, "The Constitution of Criminal Justice in Canada," in
Benjamin L Berger & James Stribopoulos, Unsettled Legacy. Thirty Years of Criminal Justice under
the Charter (Markham: LexisNexis, 2012) 3 at 7.
51. Hamish Stewart, Principles ofFundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 307 [Stewart,
Principles ofFundamental Justice].
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possibility of imprisonment.52 Starting with the Motor Vehicle Reference,53
s. 7 protection was slowly extended to substantive rights within the criminal
justice system,5 ' then to rights within the larger area of the administration
of justice," and finally to issues outside the realm of the administration of
justice altogether, as "s. 7 should protect all Charter values, not just legal
rights."56
This expansion also allowed for a diversification in what would offend
the right to life, liberty and security of the person, as this came to include
the right to be free from state-induced stress5 7 and the right to make
autonomous choices. Such personal choices have thus far been related to
where one could live," what medical treatment 5 9 to give to one's children,
whether to terminate one's pregnancy,6 0 and ultimately to choose assisted
death in certain circumstances.6 1
3. Cause of the deprivation
In order to trigger s. 7, the infringement of protected rights needs to be
brought about by state action, which includes "laws and regulations, as
well as actions of the police and other governmental officials in their
treatment of individuals,"6 2 and these must be sufficiently connected to the
breach. To establish a causal link, a claimant needs to show that there is
relationship of "sufficient causation" between a law or the action of a state
agent and the deprivation.6 3 The "sufficient connection" test was reinforced
in Bedford as the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the respondents'
52. Examples of these procedural rights include the right to silence (R v Hebert (1990), 77 CR 3d)
145 (SCC) [Hebert]; R v Singh, [2007] 3 SCR 405 [Singh]), the right against self-incrimination (R v
White, [1999] 2 SCR 417), the right to disclosure of the prosecutor's case (R v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3
SCR 326, 68 CCC (3d) 1 [Stinchcombe]), and others.
53. Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 at para 52 [MVR]. The position was reinforced in
Reference re ss 193 and 195.1(1)c ofthe Criminal Code (Man), [1990] SCJ No 52, [1990] 1 SCR 1123
[The Solicitation Reference].
54. R v Vaillancourt (1987) 60 CR (3d) 280 (SCC); R v Martineau (1990) 79 CR (3d) 129 (SCC)
[Martineau]; United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7. [Burns]; Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General),
2005 SCC 35 [Chaoulli]; PHS, supra note 9.
55. New Brunswick (Minister ofHealth and Community Services) v G(J), [1999] 3 SCR 46 at para
58 [G(J)].
56. Godbout v Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 SCR 844 at para 63 (minority opinion). [Godbout];
Winnipeg Child and Family Services VKLW, [2000] 2 SCR 519 atparas 86-87 [KLW].
57. G(J), supra note 55, Blencoe v British Columbia, [2000] 2 SCR 307 [Blencoe]; R v DB, [2008]
2 SCR 3 [DB].
58. Godbout, supra note 56.
59. R v Parker, (2000) 146 CCC (3d) 193 (Ont CA) [Parker].
60. R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30 [Morgentaler] (most notably Wilson J's separate opinion).
61. Carter, supra note 9.
62. RWDSU, Local 580 v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573 at para 196 [Dolphin Delivery].
63. Blencoe, supra note 57 at para 60; R v Suresh, 2002 SCC 1 at para 54 [Suresh]; Burns, supra note
54 at para 57.
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position arguing for the maintenance of the "sufficient connection" test
instead of the Crown's argument for a "necessary connection" test.6 4
Early Charter jurisprudence excluded matters of policy from the
application of s. 7. Policy was often understood as the actions of the
executive branch aimed at uniformly regulating a given matter of public
interest, and for such actions the government would be held accountable by
the people rather than the courts.6 5 Pieces of legislation, such as criminal
provisions, would be subject to Charter review, but the underlying policy
rationale that led to the enactment of those provisions was not.6 6
However, many subsequent cases were infused with underlying
policy considerations.6 7 The express refusal to intervene on policy matters
was completely abandoned after Chaoulli,6 8 where the court found that
a Quebec law which prohibited access to private health insurance was
endangering lives because the public healthcare system was flawed. Courts
were soon showing a willingness to review notjust legislation with policy
impact, but policy documents of administrative bodies which they found
akin to legislation, including municipal by-laws,6 9 collective agreements,7 0
and rules of regulatory bodies.7n The SCC developed a framework for
separating what it called "legislative policies" (i.e., rules of the executive
with binding effects on those to whom they apply) from "administrative/
internal guidelines. "72
Section 7 has never quite become the tool for promoting socio
economic rights that many scholars supporting court reviews of social
64. Bedford, supra note 9 at para 75; Bedford, supra note 9 (Factum of the Respondent at para 65-
66). I am indebted to Alan Young for generously sharing this factum with me.
65. MVR, supra note 53 at para 119.
66. Ibid at paras 115, 128.
67. Martineau, supra note 54; R v Daviault, [1994] 2 SCR 63 [Daviault]; Morgentaler, supra note
60; Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 519 [Rodriguez], Solicitation
Reference, supra note 53; Goudbout, supra note 58.
68. Chaoulli, supra note 54. The decision was rendered under the Quebec Charter and not
the Canadian Charter Nonetheless, the non-binding minority opinions addressed the potential
implications of this decision on s 7 at paras 109153) and Chaoulli was later applied by courts in s 7
analyses (PHS, supra note 8 at para 84; Bedford, supra note 8 at paras 98 & 118; Carter supra note 8
at para 64).
69. ictoria (City) vAdams, 2008 BCSC 1363, 2009 BCCA 563 [Adams]; Ramsden v Peterborough
(City), [1993] 2 SCR 1084; Montreal (City) v 2952-1366 Quebec Inc, 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 SCR
141.
70. Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 SCR 211.
71. Black v Law Society ofAlberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591; Great Vancouver Transport Authority v
Canadian Federation ofStudents-British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31 [GVTA].
72. GVT4, ibid at para 53.
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policies hoped it would.7 3 However, courts' willingness to review these
policies did add another layer of complexity to the debate surrounding
what could cause an infringement of someone's s. 7 rights. While for a
long time, the only rights reviewable under s. 7 were negative rights (the
obligation of the state not to intervene), Chaoulli re-opened an older debate
regarding positive rights (the obligation of the state to take action).74 Some
courts have recognized, in limited circumstances, certain positive rights
under s. 7 concerning state-funded counselling in child proceedings, 75 the
erection of a shelter in a public park, 76 and the obligation of a minister to
grant a discretionary exemption for a safe-injection clinic to function.
The same position was taken by the dissent in Gosselin, a case which
involved the state's constitutional obligations regarding the distribution
of welfare benefits, and which is considered the leading case on positive
rights under s. 7. While the majority in Gosselin found that the state had
no such obligation to the claimant, they stated that there might be limited
circumstances where the state would have an obligation to take action,
remarking that "an affirmative right to basic subsistence might one day be
protected under s. 7."
The recognition of substantive rights under s. 7, the courts' willingness
to review policy matters, and the attempt to include socio-economic
rights and other positive rights under the s. 7 analysis have developed
together in the jurisprudence. In light of the progressively more inclusive
73. Margot Young "Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice" (2013) 50 Osgoode
Hall LJ 669 [Young, "Social Justice"]; Marie-Eve Sylvestre, "The Redistributive Potential of Section
7 of the Canadian Charter: Incorporating Socio-economic Context in Criminal Law and in the
Adjudication of Rights" (2012) 42:3 Ottawa L Rev 389; Martha Jackman, "The Last Line of Defence
for [Which?] Citizens: Accountability, Equality, and the Rights to Health Care under Chaoulli," (2006)
44:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 349.
74. See, e.g., Margot Young, "Sleeping Rough and Shooting Up: Taking British Columbia's Urban
Justice Issues to Cour" [Young, "Sleeping Rough"] in Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, Advancing
SocialRights in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at 413-441.
75. G(J), supra note 55.
76. Adams, supra note 69.
77. PHS, supra note 8.
78. Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84 at para 319 [Gosselin].
79. Ibid at para 83. The discussion of positive rights under s 7 is complicated. This is a brief
overview, and not an attempt to exhaust the topic. For more in-depth discussion on the matter see
e.g. Young, "Social Justice," supra note 73; Sylvestre, supra note 73; Jackman, supra note 73;
Vanessa A MacDonnell, "The Protective Function and Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms" (2012) 17:1 Rev Const Studies 53; Cara Wilkie & Meryl Zisman Gary, "Positive and
Negative Rights under the Charter: Closing the Divide to Advance Equality" (2011) 30 Windsor Rev
Legal & Soc Issues 37; Mel Cousins, "Health Care and Human Rights after Auton and Chaoulli"
(2009) 54 McGill LJ 717; Kerri A Froc, "Constitutional Coalescence: Substantive Equality as a
Principle of Fundamental Justice" (2012) 42:3 Ottawa L Rev 411; Young, "Sleeping Rough," supra
note 74; Jamie Cameron, "Positive Obligations under Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter: A Comment on
Gosselin v. Quebec" (2003) 20 SCLR (2d) 65 [Cameron, "Positive Obligations"].
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s. 7 jurisprudence, courts will likely continue to take scholarly criticism
to heart, and the list of potential sources and causes of s. 7 breaches is
probably not closed.
4. Principles offundamentaljustice
State action (or sometimes inaction) which infringes on someone's life,
liberty or security of the person will only trigger an application of s. 7 if
it is in breach of a principle of fundamental justice. What the principles
of fundamental justice are, is to this day controversial and sometimes
confusing."
The principles of fundamental justice analysis developed, for
substantive rights, as a balancing exercise between the rationale of the
law and the rights it infringed." The balancing of rights became an
important aspect of applying self-standing principles with the rise of "the
proportionality triumvirate."82 The principles making up this triumvirate,
namely arbitrariness (that is, when a law bears no relationship to the
purpose of the legislation),8 3 overbreadth (when a law is broader than
necessary to achieve its purpose) 4 and gross disproportionality (when a
law's effects on rights are extreme)" are currently recognized as the main
substantive principles of fundamental justice.
As part of the analysis under these three principles, courts have
increasingly employed empirical social science evidence in order to
evaluate whether the purpose of the legislation is connected to its
effects, and to evaluate the impact of the provisions on individual rights.
For example, the Court of Appeal in Bedford used this kind of data to
show that three provisions of the Criminal Code-those prohibiting the
operation of common bawdy-houses, living off the avails of prostitution,
and communicating in public for the purpose of prostitution-had very
little effectiveness in preventing harm and public nuisance, but increased
the risks to sex workers.8 6 On this basis, the court found the provisions
80. On this matter see, e.g., Alan N Young, "Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the
Minimum Content of Criminal Law," [Alan Young, "Done Nothing Wrong"] in Jamie Cameron
& James Stribopoulos, The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-Five Years Later (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2008) at 441-511 [Cameron & Stribopoulos].
81. MVR, supra note 53; Rodriguez, supra note 67 at para 141; R v Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 SCR
571 at paras 110-122 [Malmo-Levine]; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth, and the Law v
Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 76 at para 8 [CFCYL].
82. Nader R Hasan, "Three Theories of Principles of Fundamental Justice" (2013) 63:2 SCLR 339
at 363.
83. Bedford, supra note 9 at para 111, Carter, supra note 9 at para 83.
84. Carter, supra note 9 at para 85.
85. Bedford, supra note 9 at para 125; Carter supra note 9 at para 89.
86. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c-46, ss 220, 212 (1)(j), & 213 (1)(c).
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overbroad and grossly disproportionate." On further appeal in Bedford,
the SCC confirmed the purposed-based nature of these principles of
fundamental justice as well as the balancing analyses they require. At the
same time, however, it made clear that the effectiveness of law was not to
be considered in the analysis; rather, the purpose of the law was simply
to be balanced against the rights infringed." More recent cases have
confirmed that the analysis of these three principles of fundamental justice
is to be conducted by searching for a disconnect between the purpose of
the law and its effects, and not by assessing the usefulness or the wisdom
of the purpose. Larger societal considerations are also not integrated at this
stage of the analysis.89
Substantive principles of fundamental justice have mostly been
analyzed in cases where the source of a breach was a legislative provision.
In the context of administrative decisions that infringe s. 7 rights, the
principle of fundamental justice analysis does not always appear to follow
the same route.90 Stewart suggests that when a discretionary state decision
based on a statute is challenged, without a challenge to the statute itself,
there is in fact no need to engage with the principles of fundamental
justice.9 1 In such cases, he argues, the balancing is to be done on a case-
by-case basis: "although the proper balancing of interests is not a principle
of fundamental justice applicable in reviewing legislation, it appears to be
a principle of fundamental justice applicable in the review of particular
discretionary decisions."92
5. Summary
Section 7 no longer applies solely to matters related to criminal justice
or even the administration of justice. For example, s. 7 has been found
to apply in cases of improper access to medical treatment, state-induced
stress, and the deprivation of autonomous choice over one's body.
Causes of the deprivation can include both legislative and non-legislative
actions, leading courts to engage actively with policy matters. Moreover,
reviews under s. 7 have been increasingly infused with notions pertaining
to social justice and citizens' welfare (as, e.g., in G(J), PHS, and the
minority opinion in Gosselin). These developments in the analysis of
87. Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186 at paras 143-150 [Bedford, CA].
88. Bedford, supra note 9 at para 123.
89. Carter, supra note 9 at paras. 71-98; R vMoriarity, 2015 SCC 55 at paras 24, 30 [Moriarity]; R
vKRJ, 2016 SCC 2016 atpara 139 [KRJ].
90. Suresh, supra note 63 at paras 54-75; Burns, supra note 54 at paras 85-124; but see PHS, supra
note 9 at paras 129-136, where the principles against overbreadth and arbitrariness were considered.
91. Stewart, Principles ofFundamental Justice, supra note 51 at 113-118.
92. Ibid at 113.
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principles of fundamental justice make way for a viable s. 7 argument
in the prison context. Purpose-based principles of fundamental justice
have been identified as the main substantive principles, often applied
by courts in relation to social science empirical evidence. By balancing
different interests, courts have concluded that certain pieces of legislation
are arbitrary, overbroad, or disproportionate. According to the recent
jurisprudence, where the breach is caused by state conduct rather than
legislation, there might not be a need to identify a specific principle of
fundamental justice. Rather, a general balancing of interests would suffice.
III. Applying s. 7 to prison directives, decisions, and practices
In this section, I argue that s. 7 of the Charter provides a viable avenue
for prisoners seeking to advance their rights. Section 7 has limitations
which make its application in the prison context challenging. However,
the breadth of the provision, the emergence of positive rights in the
jurisprudence, the interpretation courts have given to "law" and "state
action," their willingness to consider policy issues, and the success of
empirical evidence in supporting recent s. 7 cases, all make this section
well-suited to offer protection for seniors whose rights are breached by
prison policies and procedures.
While s. 7 has been used in prison litigation before, it was in very
different contexts from what is envisioned here.9 3 Some successful s.
7 challenges have won rights for prisoners with respect to disciplinary
hearings9 4 and s. 7 violations have been found in cases of involuntary
transfers.9 5 Both of these cases concerned procedural rights, and the
few cases asserting substantive rights under s. 7 have largely been
unsuccessful.9 6 A significant exception to this trend was the recent BCCLA
case, under appeal at the time of writing, where the CCRA provisions
allowing for indefinite administrative segregation were found in breach of
s. 7. In other words, solitary confinement in itself was not unconstitutional
as long as the legislation provided for a cap on it.9 7 The lack of appropriate
93. For a comprehensive review of s 7 cases in the prison context see Parkes, supra note 41 at 642-
651.
94. Pickard v Mountain Institution (1994), 30 CR (4th) 399, 75 FTR 147 (TD).
95. DeMaria v Canada (Regional Transfer Board and warden ofJoyceville Institution), [1988] 2 FC
480 (FCTD); Storey v William Head Institution, [1997] FCJ No 1768 (TD); May, supra note 34.
96. Piche v Canada (Solicitor General), (1984), 17 CCC (3d) 1, aff'd (1989) 47 CCC (CA) [Piche];
Williams v Canada (Commissioner of Corrections), [1993] FCJ No 646 (TD); Protective Custody
Inmates, Kent Institution v Kent Institution, [ 1991] FCJ No 1539 (CA); Fieldhouse v Canada (1995),
40 CR (4th) 263 (BCCA) [Fieldhouse]. For a successful s 7 challenge see Criminal TrialLawyersAssn
v Alberta (Solicitor General), 2004 ABQB 534. For a critique of the Fieldhouse decision, see Allan
Manson, "Fieldhouse and the Diminution of Charter Scrutiny," (1994) 33:4 CR 358.
97. BCCLA, supra note 5 atparas 88-177.
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medical treatment in prison was also challenged under s. 7, but it was
settled out of court.98 It is my contention that in the context of older
prisoners, a substantive s. 7 argument may have a different fate, mostly
because the argument would be supported by empirical evidence. 99 In the
past, courts have used empirical datato find breaches of different groups' s.
7 rights (e.g., sex-workers),oo and older offenders' legal situations should
similarly improve with the emergence of empirical data pointing to the
threat that some prison practices pose to the life and security of the person.
1. Entitlement: Life and security of the person
The first step in triggering the application of s. 7 is to show that legislative
or non-legislative state action infringes on the right to life, liberty, or
security of the person. Such decisions have generally been made on a case-
by-case basis,101 although when such a decision will likely occur can still
be inferred from the existing case law.
Section 7 has been interpreted to protect physical liberty, the
right not to be exposed to health risks, control over one's body, and
psychological integrity.102 For example, transferring a prisoner to a higher
form of security can be a deprivation of his right to physical liberty.103
Restrictions on therapeutic abortion were also found to offend s. 7 in
that they created health risks to the woman, depriving her of security of
the person by potentially endangering her life.104 The right to security of
the person has also been breached by allowing teachers and parents to
physically discipline children,0 ' by restricting someone's control over
their body through a prohibition on assisted suicide,106 by administrative
delays in adjudicating a complaint before a human rights tribunal, 10 7 or
by imposing psychological stress.10 s While there is no general right to
medical healthcare under s. 7,109 it has been decided that provisions which
98. See Parkes, supra note 41 at 649-650.
99. Parkes argues that part of the challenge to successful prison litigation is a lack of research
external to the CSC; see Parkes, supra note 41 at 668. In BCCL4 the partial success was also owed
to the large amount of empirical data introduced by the complainants regarding the effects of solitary
confinement on individuals, BCCL4, supra note 5.
100. See, e.g., Bedford, supra note 9; Kerr discusses the importance of empirical research in Charter
cases in Kerr, supra note 2 at 76-91.
101. Sharpe & Roach, supra note 44 at 224.
102. Peter Hogg, The Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 47-7-47-19.
103. May, supra note 34.
104. Morgentaler supra note 60.
105. CFCYL, supra note 81.
106. Rodriguez, supra note 67; Carter supra note 9.
107. Blencoe, supra note 57.
108. G(J), supra note 55; DB, supra note 57.
109. Sharpe & Roach, supra note 44 at 220.
Employing Older Prisoner Empirical Data 517
to Test a Novel s. 7 Charter Claim
endanger health, such as serious and widespread delays in the healthcare
system, do infringe the right to life and security of the person.110
Looking at the context of older prisoners, most seniors suffer from
a mixture of conditions: 35% reported between 1 and 5 conditions, 27%
between 6 and 7, and 27% between 8 and 16. Many of these conditions,
while not unique to the elderly, do occur significantly more often in older
age groups-these include mental health problems, chronic pain, physical
disability, cancer, diabetes, digestive problems, circulatory issues, heart
conditions, risk of stroke and cardiac arrest, digestive problems, and
polypharmacy, among others-and they have a more intense impact on an
older body than on a younger one.' Thus, older people are more likely to
be in need of medical care, and the lack of appropriate treatment for such
a host of conditions disproportionately affects this group.
The study indicated that the failure to address such medical issues
among this age group, whether physical or mental, has led to an acceleration
of disease and an accumulation of other illnesses. 1 1 2 Institutional responses,
which include segregation, also appear to be both a consequence and a
cause of accelerated physical and mental illnesses. The main problems
that may endanger the lives and health of older prisoners (and so violate
their right to security of the person) are presented below. The problems
identified are systemic, but they can also be tied to individual cases.
a. Medical diets
Properly adjusted diets were not readily available for people with chronic
conditions such as diabetes (which was reported by 35% of the sample).
For these people, the lack of an adequate diet can not only aggravate their
illness, but it can be the difference between life and death.11 3
b. Medical devices
Medical devices and supplies were not readily available for people with
disabilities or other mobility problems (reported by 54% of the sample).
Only 6% reported receiving regular help with their mobility issues, and
only 30% reported receiving the items they requested to ease their living
situation (such as walkers, extra pillows, braces, etc.). The lack of medical
devices created a vicious cycle that endangered people's lives and personal
security. There was a statistically relevant connection between the number
110. Chaoulli, supra note 54; Morgentaler, supra note 60; PHS, supra note 9; Carter, supra note 9.
111. Cassel et al, supra note 15; Andrade, supra note 15, Jagger et al, supra note 15.
112. Adelina Iftene, "Elderly Inmates in Canadian Prisons: Specific Needs and Institutional & Legal
Responses," PhD Dissertation [unpublished], Queen's University Archives, at 141-178 [Iftene,
"Elderly Inmates"].
113. For an extensive description of the findings related to older offenders, see ibid.
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of medical conditions and the likelihood of having them left unaddressed.
Unaddressed medical conditions, in turn, were statistically connected to
an increase in sleeping problems. Sleeping problems themselves appeared
to be causing or aggravating mental conditions. For example, 40% of
the sample reported at least one diagnosis of mental illness, and 70%
of these reported having constant problems falling asleep. 45% of those
not reporting a mental illness also reported difficulties sleeping, mostly
because of noise and their own anxiety. Finally, mental illness appeared to
increase the risk of suicide, and of being disciplined or sent to segregation.
Punitive responses could, in turn, be traced to negative impacts on both
mental and physical well-being.
c. Mental health treatment
The mental health professionals available were insufficient. In one
institution, there was one psychologist available for 600 inmates. In
three institutions, people were entitled to three psychological counselling
sessions for the duration of their stay in that prison, which could be as
long as fifteen years. In one of the largest institutions, all 33 participants
reported that the psychiatrist would not see anyone unless they reported
being suicidal; however, if they were suicidal, they would then be sent to
segregation. As a result, only 5% of the overall 30% (i.e., one in six) of
participants reporting suicidal ideation asked for help, mostly due to fear
of being placed in solitary confinement. Whether they were suicidal or not,
people reporting mental illnesses appeared more likely to have spent time
in segregation than those not reporting mental illness. In particular, 64% of
those reporting mental illnesses had spent time in segregation since turning
50, in contrast to the 36% who reported being segregated but did not report
suffering from psychiatric conditions. In addition, those reporting mental
illnesses appeared more predisposed to be victims of peer abuse (i.e. 70%
versus 40% for those who did not report mental problems).114
d. Pain treatment
48% reported being in constant severe pain, and, among those treated for it,
43% reported that the treatment was ineffective. The only pain medication
available was Tylenol 3, which was used to treat everything from arthritis
to terminal cancer pain. The study also confirmed a statistical relationship
between undertreated pain and sleep problems, which were connected to
mental health problems.
114. For a discussion regarding the gap between seniors' mental health issues and the available
correctional treatment, see Iftene, "Unlocking the Doors," supra note 22.
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e. Medical personnel and medication pick-up protocol
Limited access to medical treatment is caused by the limited availability of
medical personnel. 76% of the study's participants had requested a consult
with a specialist since turning 50, with wait times ranging from 3 months
(e.g., for dentists) to 3 years (e.g., for cardiologists). When prisoners felt
sick, regardless the intensity or nature of the illness they needed to file
a request to see the nurse, and the average wait time was two days. In
some cases, people suffering from painful tooth abscesses had to wait
weeks to be seen by a dentist. Some chronically or terminally ill people
received very little palliative care, and access to escorts to take them to
a community hospital was limited because of resources. In half of the
institutions I visited, a nurse was not available after 5 pm.
The effects of delay in receiving medical treatment are jarringly
reflected in the case of John, a 62-year old individual incarcerated in a
penitentiary in Southern Ontario. He reported having been diagnosed with
a number of conditions, including heart disease, circulatory problems
(thrombosis) and an aneurysm in his right leg. At the time of our interview,
he was taking six prescription pills daily, and the pills needed to be picked
up in person each morning. The line for medication pick-up formed
outdoors, in the yard of the penitentiary, during all seasons. Each prisoner
had to stand in line from 8 to 9 am on most days. John complained that
he was not given a chair to sit on because he did not have a physical
disability. He reported that his waiting time was always approximatively
an hour, regardless of when he lined up, because younger prisoners would
regularly cut in line. As well, in order to see a nurse or a doctor, each
prisoner had to file a request that generally took two days to be answered,
irrespective of the treatment sought or the degree of urgency. In the last
six months before the interview, John filed a request complaining of chest
pains. Even though he reported that his medical history was present in
the nurse's file, he waited for two days to see the doctor, by which time
the pains had subsided. During the month prior to the interview, John's
leg aneurysm burst. Because of the remote location of the institution, it is
customary to take prisoners in urgent need of help to the hospital in a CSC
van rather than calling an ambulance. The prisoner reported that because
the van left at a time when the shift was changing, the van stopped at the
gate and waited 15 minutes for the guards to switch places before they left
for the hospital.
The institutional practice that requires all individuals to wait standing
in line outdoors to pick up their medication exposes prisoners with frail
health to increased risks. For example, an older individual commonly
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suffers from a greater number of conditions and disabilities.' In addition,
older people are more likely to wait in line longer than their younger peers,
especially since they reported being regularly bullied and cut off in line.116
While having a 30-year-old wait half an hour for headache medication
might not raise issues, having a 60-year-old do the same thing for
antibiotics to treat his reoccurring pneumonia, or for blood thinners to treat
his leg aneurysm, does cause concern. This practice thus poses a risk to
both the physical health and the personal security of these older individuals
as they are always exposed to the increased stress of facing death and
injury for not having their medical needs properly addressed at any given
time. Restrictions and delays in such health care have been recognized as
posing risks to life and security of the person in other contexts, notably in
Morgentaler".. and Chaoulli,118 and these cases should apply by analogy.
2. Causal sources of the deprivation
To summanize, the following issues pertaining to the management of
chronic diseases were identified above as endangering prisoners' life and
security of the person: the use of segregation for mentally ill prisoners;
insufficient numbers of medical personnel, particularly mental health
specialists; lack of appropriate medical diets; restricted availability or
lack of medical supplies for those suffering from disabilities; and limited
medication for chronic pain.
However, an infringement of the right to life and security of the person
is not on its own sufficient to make out a s. 7 claim. The claimant still
needs to show a sufficient causal connection between the infringement
and the legislative or non-legislative action of the state. Cases such as
Operation Dismantlell9 established early on that what endangers the life
or security of a person must be legislative provisions, decisions, or actions
of the executive or administrative branches of the government.
The sources of the breaches that endanger the life and personal security
of older prisoners can be placed into two categories, each of which satisfies
this requirement in a different way. The sources are either Commissioner's
Directives (CD), Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), and other general
115. The most common diseases were arthritis (51%), severe heart problems (24%), hypertension
(42%), circulation (20%), foot problems (17%), back problems (32%), diabetes (27%), and digestive
problems (25%). All of these have been associated with aging in the medical literature. 54% of the
participants also reported mobility problems, which similarly occurs more often with aging. See
Iftene, "Elderly Inmates," supra note 112 at 91.
116. 32% have been cut in line regularly, 28% have been threatened, 29% hit or pushed, and 45%
ridiculed (see Iftene, "Elderly Inmates," supra note 112 at 113).
117. Morgentaler, supra note 60.
118. Chaoulli, supra note 54.
119. Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441 at para 50.
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documents referred to as "frameworks," all of which are akin to legislation,
or prison practices and officials' discretionary decisions, which are state
conduct.
a. Sources of the deprivations
First, the data collected from the study shows that a significant number of
older individuals suffer from a mental illness, and these individuals have
been sent to segregation significantly more often than those who have not
reported a mental illness. Segregation of the mentally ill is allowed by
a number of Commissioner's Directives. CD 843 Management of Self-
injurious Inmates and Suicidal Behavior, in essence, legitimizes the use
of segregation as a response to mental illness.12 0 CD 589 Discipline of
Inmatesl2 1 does not mention mental illness as a criterion to be considered
when deciding whether to use segregation as part of discipline.1 2 2 As
shown, mental illness is correlated to disciplinary charges. Mentally ill
people likely have a harder time complying with prison rules and often end
up in disciplinary segregation, which in turn may aggravate their mental
health status.
While CD 709 Administrative Segregation mentions that this type of
segregation should not "normally" be used for mentally ill prisoners, it
does not prohibit the practice.12 3 In fact, the institutional standing orders
use "suicide watch" to mean administrative segregation. In particular, in
response to an Access to Information request, I was informed that "there is
120. CD 843 Management of Inmate Self-Injurious and Suicidal Behavior Correctional Service
Canada, online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca> [CD 843]. In the recent BCCIA, the court decided that the
CCRA provisions allowing for administrative segregation for mentally ill prisoners are in violation of
s 15 of the Charter BCCLA, supra note 5 at para 522. The decision is at the moment of writing under
appeal. However, even if upheld, the ruling will have no impact on the practice of placing mentally
ill prisoners in other forms of isolation (that can be justified as "medical" in addition to simply
correctional), such as observation cells etc. On that point, see Sheila Wildeman, "The other solitary:
Psychiatric isolation needs to end, too," The Globe and Mail (31 January 2018), online: <https://
www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-other-solitary-abusing-mental-health-based-confinement/
article37806269/>.
121. CD 580 Discipline of Inmates (2015), Correctional Service Canada, online: <www.csc-scc.
gc.ca> [CD 580].
122. Administrative and disciplinary segregation are based on two different types of reasons.
Disciplinary segregation is used as punishment for a disciplinary offence, and it is limited to 30
days (CCRA, supra note 1, s 44(1)). In contrast, administrative segregation is used for an indefinite
number of reasons, including prevention, undesirable behavior, self-harm, and protection against other
prisoners. There is no time limitation on its use. (CCRA, supra note 1, s 31).
123. CD 707 Administrative Segregation (2015), Correctional Service Canada, online: <www.
csc-scc.gc.ca> [CD 707]. Currently, the policy regarding solitary confinement is undergoing some
changes. Bill C-59 attempts to limit the amount of time people are locked up in segregation for,
and recommends that severely mentally ill prisoners not be placed in segregation. However, without
outright prohibiting the practice for any mentally ill prisoners, and without defining "severely," it is
unclear if the bill will have any positive effects on this group of people.
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no separate regulation from CD 709 for segregating mentally ill or suicidal
prisoners."124 The only difference is that they need to be under supervision
while segregated in accordance with CD 843. Through the same Access
to Information Act request, I was provided with the Standing Orders for
Use of Administrative Segregation for Joyceville Institution, Collins Bay
Institution, and Millhaven Institution. All three standing orders essentially
provided that the "suicide watch cells are located in administrative
segregation" and that self-harm incidents are to be treated as "security
incidents" in accordance with the relevant CDs, including CD 709.125
They also mentioned that the first response for any security incident is
administrative segregation, and the mental status of the individual will be
checked only on the next working day. After being checked, the individual
may continue to remain in segregation even if diagnosed with a mental
illness.126
Second, improper treatment of mental illness exists in the larger
context of insufficient access to medical specialists. Lack of timely and
efficient access to specialist care endangers the lives of prisoners and
exposes them to health risks. The CSC Health Services compiles the
list of medical positions to be filled in correctional institutions, and the
number of people to be hired is decided at the Regional Health Service
level. Hiring decisions are then approved by each Regional Director of
the CSC Health Services Department. However, according to the current
hiring protocol of the CSC for Ontario, Warkworth Institution, a prison
housing 600 prisoners of whom nearly 200 are over the age of 50, employs
one physician and one psychologist. It does not disclose the number
of nurses.1 27 Other Ontario institutions have between three and five
psychologists available, but none has more than one physician, and Bath
Institution has no physician. The Regional Hospital also has one physician
and no psychologist,1 2 8 and no social workers or occupational therapists
are available in any institution except Bath. A psychiatrist occasionally
visits each regional institution based on its clinic's hours of operation, but
124. Document A-2015-00641. These documents and explanations were obtained in May 2016
through an Access to Information Act request.
125. Standing Order No 709, Administrative Segregation, Collins Bay Institution, 2016; Standing
Order No 709; Administrative Segregation, Joyceville Institution, 2015; Standing Order No 709,
Administrative Segregation, Millhaven Institution, 2016. Obtained through an Access to Information
Act request, May 2016.
126. Standing Order No 709, Administrative Segregation, Collins Bay Institution, 2016, at 38;
Standing Order No. 709; Administrative Segregation, Joyceville Institution 2015, at 53-54.
127. Document A-2015-00641. These documents and explanations were obtained in May 2016,
through an Access to Information Act request.
128. Ibid.
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each institution is served by only one psychiatrist, with most institutions
sharing the same psychiatrist.12 9 This reality explains the responses
from the study's participants that the psychiatrist is generally available
for only 5 minutes every second year or so and that their main role is to
assess suicide risk. It also explains the waiting time for seeing a nurse
or a specialist even for emergency situations. It thus appears that CSC is
understaffed in key medical fields, which is ultimately a CSC decision.
The Office of the Correctional Investigator has similarly found that the
number of mental health specialists available is insufficient to deal with
the overwhelming number of cases.13 0
Third, many older prisoners are on medical diets that they claim are
inappropriate. While CD 880, Food Servicesl3 1 requires that medical diets
be available, SOP 800-01 Food Services-Central Feeding3 2 states that
the regular food served should be adapted to meet most therapeutic diets.
Hence, all people on a medical diet receive the same meal, which is made
for the most serious type of illnesses, even if some individuals do not need
such a strict diet. This high-level policy entails that all inmates in need of
a medical diet are deprived of nutrition regardless of their actual needs. It
is thus not surprising that most participants stated that they cannot live on
such a diet.
Fourth, the method of distributing medication which forces people to
stand in a pick-up line each morning, regardless of the ailment, is regulated
by the Distribution andAdministration ofMedication Guidelines.13 3 While
this document allows medication to be taken to inmates in some cases,
it does not specify any circumstances in which this is to be done. The
document also requires that prescription medication be picked up daily
in person,13 and the section dealing with the "appropriate setting" for the
dispensary only mentions that it needs to be a secure place with sufficient
lighting to store the medication.1 3 5 Four options for medication distribution
are listed, one ofthem being an "external window." Thus, in such situations,
the line may form outside, and the prisoners will have to line up and wait to
129. Ibid.
130. Sapers, OCI, 2010-2011, supra note 3; Sapers, OCI, 2011-2012, supra note 23.
131. CD 880, Food Services, (2000), Correctional Service Canada, online; <www.csc-scc.gc.ca> [CD
880].
132. SOP 880-01 Food Services-Central Feeding (2000), Correctional Service Canada, online:
<www.csc-scc.gc.ca> [SOP 880-01].
133. Correctional Service Canada, Health Sector, "Medication Distribution and Administration,"
10 July 2014, obtained through Access to Information Act request, May 2016 [CSC, "Medication
Distribution"].
134. Ibid at 13.
135. Ibid at 5.
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receive the medication regardless of the weather conditions. The location
of each pill dispensation window was approved for each institution by its
respective warden about fifteen years ago. Based on information received
through the Access to Information Act, at least two institutions included
in my study, Bath and Warkworth Institutions, have exterior pick-up
windows.136 This information reinforces the claims of prisoners that they
have to line up outside to pick up their daily medication, regardless of or
the weather and of how sick they are.
Fifth, medical equipment and supplies that older prisoners need to
deal with their chronic pain and diseases are not available, or else their
availability is severely restricted. The National Essential Healthcare
Framework is a document created by the CSC's Health Care Department
and signed by the Deputy Commissioner that, among other things, lists
the supplies that may be prescribed by a physician to sick prisoners.137
Annex A lists a number of items that may be granted, such as walkers
and canes, and forbids items such as medical mattresses, extra pillows or
blankets, heated pads, and orthopedic shoes. However, all of these items
are used to manage chronic pain, poor circulation, and foot diseases that
are associated with aging in the community.138 In addition, the document
mentions that other items need "special authorization from the Warden
or the regional director, based on the recommendation of the institutional
physician or dentist along with the medical justification for the request."
This delegation of decision-making power explains the study's finding
that access to supplies was much more difficult in some institutions than
in others, despite the similar incidence of medical conditions. The breadth
of the framework, as well as individual Wardens' decisions not to grant
supplies, are legally problematic and they endanger the health and security
of the person of individuals who are in pain or have mobility issues.
By the same token, access to medication that is commonly used to
manage chronic pain and other diseases is severely limited. The CSC
National Drug Formulary is the official list of medication available,
and it is signed off by the Commissioner and the Health Care Deputy
Commissioner.13 9 This document confirms that the only prescription
painkillers available in penitentiaries are Tylenol 3 and, in special
136. Document A-2015-00640, Access to Information Request Notification, May 2016.
137. Correctional Service Canada, National Essential Healthcare Framework, 23 July 2015. This
document was obtained in April 2016 through an Access to Information Act request [CSC, Healthcare
Framework].
138. Iftene, supra note 20 at 72.
139. Correctional Service Canada, National Drug Formulary [CSC, Formulary]. This document was
obtained in April 2016 through an Access to Information Act request.
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cases, methadone.140 It also provides that all community prescriptions
for painkillers will be changed to Tylenol 3, since it is the cheapest
compound.' For comparison purposes, in the community, Tylenol 3 is
used to manage only mild to moderate pain, but nothing higher than that.142
According to the responses to this study, as well as the medical review
conducted by the Office of the Correctional Investigator,143 the available
medication is insufficient to manage the varied types of chronic pain that
individuals suffer from, especially if they are older.
b. The nature of the sources of deprivation
Even though both legislation and state conduct are reviewable under s.
7, it is important to establish the nature of the source of each breach. The
principles of fundamental justice analysis and the opportunities for public
standing may be different depending on whether the source of the breach
is legislation or state conduct. Also, state conduct, unlike legislative
breaches, cannot be justified under s. 1. Finally, for legislative breaches
remedies are granted under s. 52, while for breaches by state conduct they
are granted under s. 24.
Directives and Frameworks as Legislative Sources
Most documents identified as potential sources of breaches are policy-
ridden in the sense that they contain rules or guidelines that emanate from
an agency to which governmental power has been delegated, and that
regulate the activity of that agency alone.144
The Commissioner's Directives and the Standing Operating
Procedures, however, are what the SCC has described in Greater
Vancouver Transportation Authority [GVTA] as "legislative policy.""14
GVTA dealt with a Charter challenge to the policies of two state-regulated
bus companies. These policies restricted the advertising opportunities
on the companies' buses based on certain criteria and thus violated the
claimants' right to free speech and to equal treatment. The court dealt at
length with the nature of the policies that constituted the sources of the
140. Ibid at 35-36.
141. Ibid at 57.
142. Tylenol 3 "is used to treat mild-to-moderate pain associated with conditions such as headache,
dental pain, muscle pain, painful menstruation, pain following an accident, and pain following
operations" (MedBroadcast, online: <http://www.medbroadcast.com/>).
143. Office of the Correctional Investigator, "National Drug Formulary Investigation," 2015, online:
<www.oci-bec.gc.ca>.
144. GVTA, supra note 71 at para 58.
145. Ibid at para 53.
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potential breaches. Citing Davidson,1 4 6 Eldridge,"' and Therens,"8 the
court stressed the importance of differentiating between policies that are
legislative in nature and those that are administrative in nature.149 Policies
identified as legislative are to be treated as law for the purpose of Charter
analysis, despite having their origin somewhere other than in Parliament
or the legislature.
To assess whether a governmental policy is legislative in nature,
GVTA articulated a concise framework, based on the rulings in the earlier
cases. The court acknowledged that there are sources of law other than
Parliamentary statutes and gave examples of municipal by-laws, collective
agreements, and the rules of regulatory bodies.5 o Thus, a law is not strictly
defined by its origin, but rather by its characteristics."1 In assessing the
nature of a governmental source, the court set out the following criteria for
identifying legislative policy: the rule is given by an agent authorized by a
statute to regulate its activity, the rules are binding on those to whom they
apply and are of general application, and they are sufficiently accessible
and precise. Such rules basically preclude arbitrary state action and provide
individuals and government entities with sufficient information as to how
they should conduct themselves. At the same time, administrative policies
are "informal" and tend to be strictly internal, lack accessibility, and often
take the shape of guidelines or "interpretative aids."15 2 Guidelines of this
sort cannot be relied on in court to defend a challenged prohibition.1 5 3 The
SCC found that the bus companies' policy limiting advertising was in
effect law for the purposes of Charter scrutiny.5
Based on this framework, the Commissioner's directives and
procedures are for all purposes the equivalent of law. CCRA delegates to
the Commissioner the authority to make rules that are binding on staff and
prisoners," and it gives him the ability to decide which rules are binding.15
Moreover, CCRA often makes reference to Commissioner's Directives,
and requires that the legislative provisions apply in accordance with the
rules developed in the CDs. The rules contained in the CDs have significant
146. Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038.
147. Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624.
148. R v Therens, [1985] 1 SCR 613.
149. GVTA, supra note 71 at para 50.
150. Ibid at para 53
151. Hogg, supra note 102.
152. GVTA, supra note 71 at paras 58-68.
153. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister ofJustice), 2000 SCC 69 at para 85
[Little Sisters].
154. GVTA, supra note 71 at paras 67-73.
155. CCRA, supra note 1, ss 96-98.
156. Ibid, s 88.
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consequences and a high potential to infringe the rights of prisoners, as they
regulate most aspects of prison life, including the creation of disciplinary
offences and sanctions.1 17 Finally, the requirement of accessibility and
precision is attached to the rules created by the Commissioner by the CCRA
itself. 15 Thus, both the directives and procedures are available online to
the public, and in print to prisoners. The standing operating procedures
fill in the regulatory details corresponding to the issues outlined by the
directives. However, they are of equally general application, they are
widely accessible, and they are binding on those to whom they apply.
They are for the directives what the Corrections and Conditional Release
Regulation is for the CCRA: a binding framework that expands on the
application of certain provisions. Under such circumstances there is little
doubt that the directives and standing operating procedures are legislative
in nature and subject to Charter scrutiny on this basis.
More controversial, however, is the analysis of prison guidelines
and frameworks under the Charter. These documents do not meet all
the required characteristics of legislative policies. The frameworks may
appear as "interpretative aids," they are strictly internal and they offer
advice to medical personnel on what items they may or may not use. They
are not readily accessible: in fact I needed to apply under the Access to
Information Act to obtain all of them. In Little Sisters the court decided
that the manual providing guidelines to customs officers on which items
should be confiscated was an administrative policy document, and in itself
it was not subjected to Charter scrutiny. Instead, the arbitrary decisions
based on this document could be challenged individually.1 5 9
The manual dismissed as an unreviewable guideline in Little Sisters
gave concrete examples of which items were prohibited, and in this it is
similar to the CSC framework that prohibits certain medical items for
disabled individuals,1 6 0 or that only allows certain medication in prisons.1 6 1
However, the prison environment presents a set of characteristics that
would make these administrative documents similar in effect to legislative
policy and thus amenable to Charter review.
In the prison environment, products are available only if CSC
purchases them. Therefore, despite the fact that a medical doctor could
in theory prescribe medications other than those in the Drug Formulary,
or recommend a medical item that is not available in the Essential
157. Ibid, s 40.
158. Ibid, s 88.
159. Little Sisters, supra note 153 at para 85.
160. CSC, Healthcare Framework, supra note 137.
161. CSC, Formulary, supra note 139.
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Healthcare Framework, that doctor's decision would have no effect. The
fact that these items are not provided for in the framework means they do
not exist in the CSC stock. Thus, while the CSC frameworks may look
similar to other administrative policies that help implement rules and
regulations, because the correctional system is a closed environment, they
go beyond simple aids. Rather, they make it impossible for professionals
to use their individual judgement in making decisions. In the language of
GVTA, these frameworks often de facto "preclude arbitrary decisions."162
Thus, the rules in this framework are mandatory not by their nature, but
by their effect: what is not included in the framework is not prohibited,
but it is not available either. A similar dynamic exists at the institutional
level. For example, the standing orders regulating the use of segregation
in each institution emanate from the warden, and they effectively limit the
discretion of front-line workers in making decisions regarding the use of
administrative segregation.
Another factor in assessing whether such frameworks are amenable
to Charter review is their effect on those to whom they apply. For
prisoners, prison rules have significant legal power and impact, with the
difference that these "laws" are largely removed, in a practical sense, from
parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Prisoners cannot get around the rules
that deny them healthcare, because their very position deprives them of
any autonomy to look for healthcare elsewhere. For instance, if a prisoner
sends a friend to pick up medication, the friend will not be permitted to
deliver it. If he attempts to purchase a medical item or medication from the
black market, he will be charged with a disciplinary offence. Needless to
say, the prisoner cannot remove himself from the environment regulated
by these frameworks, so he can only use what the frameworks make
available to him.
Based on the effect these frameworks have on prisoners' rights and
the fact that they preclude other types of discretionary decision-making,
they should be viewed as legislative policy. They do not fit with all GVTA
criteria simply because CSC chose not to make them easily accessible and
to use the language of guidelines. This deliberate choice should not allow
the agency to insulate binding documents from Charter review.
Administrative Decisions as State Conduct
Some breaches can be traced back to discretionary decisions made by
senior correctional officials. For instance, the Hiring Protocol is a document
emanating from the regional director who has discretion in setting the
162. GVTA, supra note 71 at para 53.
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number of positions available. I have argued above that this document
is one of the sources of the breach that occurs due to insufficient medical
personnel. The hiring protocol is closer in nature to a discretionary agency
decision and would qualify as state conduct for the purpose of Charter
review. The harm that may result due to insufficient medical services
is sufficiently connected to the director's decision not to hire enough
personnel to provide such services.
Similarly, the decisions of the warden to withhold medical items that
are listed as available for medical prescription by the Essential Healthcare
Framework should be reviewable as state conduct. According to the
framework, all items that are theoretically available for medical personnel
to prescribe must be approved at the warden's discretion. Thus, when the
framework fails to list certain drugs or prohibits certain items, it is the
framework that is the source of the breach. When the items are available
according to the framework, but are rejected at the warden's discretion
(as in Warkworth Institution, where there is a blanket prohibition on the
prescription of any medical items or devices) then the source of the breach
is the warden's decision.
Prison Practices as State Conduct
A group of practices has never been analyzed as a source of breaches of
s. 7 substantive rights. However, in the context of imprisonment, it would
be extremely detrimental to the rights of prisoners to let injurious practices
elude Charter scrutiny just because it may be difficult to trace them back
to a particular source.
The practice of having older prisoners stand in line for hours, outdoors,
to pick up their daily medication likely originates from the decision of a
warden at some point in time. However, in most cases records of such
decisions cannot be located or identified,1 6 3 and the practices are currently
rooted in nothing but mere routine and a guideline that suggests that the
practice is allowed.1 6 4 The difficulties in locating such sources do not
make the practice less harmful or less binding on the individual to whom
it applies. A sufficient connection undeniably exists between the general
prison setting for medication pick-up and an increased chance of harm
to sick individuals due to prolonged periods of standing outdoors, in bad
weather.
163. Through an Access to Information Act request I was informed that the decisions as to where
to place the location of medication dispensing windows were made decades ago and the relevant
documents cannot be located any longer.
164. CSC, "Medication Distribution," supra note 133.
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There is some evidence that prison practices would be reviewable in
court. First, while there have been no successful s. 7 prison cases to date
holding that administrative prison practices caused a s. 7 deprivation of
life or liberty, such cases have been brought to court. Even though they
failed, it was not because the prison practice was not a valid source or
because it did not bear sufficient causal connection to the breach. Indeed,
controversial cases such as Bergeronl6 5 (where prison officers did not
keep their side of a deal with a prisoner), Pichel6 6 (which concerned the
practice of double-bunking), Fieldhousel6 7 (which concerned compulsory
urinalyses in the absence of individualized suspicion) failed because the
court could not find a sufficient deprivation of security of the person or
a principle of fundamental justice that was breached. The validity of the
source and the causal link was never questioned.
Second, written and unwritten abusive state procedures have been
acknowledged as violating s. 7 in the context of procedural rights.1 6 8
Thus, the isolated or systemic practice of police officers who interrogate
people without informing them of their rights may lead to a breach of
the right to silence as protected by s. 7. While procedural and substantive
issues are conceptually distinct under s. 7, courts have applied an identical
analysis. Hence, a distinction between sources of causation would not be
an explanation for this situation.
Third, prison rules and practices have been recognized as
unconstitutional under other sections of the Charter, notably s. 12. In
Trang, for instance, the complainants were forced to use stained underwear,
were double-bunked and deprived of appropriate food. This treatment was
found to violate s. 12, despite the fact that the causal source was neither an
identifiable administrative decision nor a piece of legislation. 16 9
In this context, the prison practices that endanger the life or security
of the person should be reviewed as state conduct for the purpose of the
s. 7 analysis.
State Inaction as a Causal Source
Both legislative and state-conduct breaches are sometimes caused by the
state's refusal to do something, and in this way the rights affected take
the shape of positive rights: for example, failure to provide medication,
165. Bergeron v Quebec, (1995) 127 DLR (4th) 458 (QC CA).
166. Piche, supra note 96.
167. Fieldhouse, supra note 96.
168. See e.g. Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, [2010] 1 SCR 44, 2010 SCC 3 [Khdar].
169. Trang v Alberta (Edmonton Remand Centre), 2010 ABQB 6; See also Munoz v Alberta, 2004
ABQB 769.
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access to medical services, or adequate medical diets might violate a
positive right. Whether the state can be asked under s. 7 to do something,
as opposed to not do something, is still a controversial question.
In general, positive rights have been associated with socio economic
rights. In Gosselin170 for example, this issue arose in the context of courts
interfering with a democratic institution's welfare policy, and amounted to
the question of whether the state had a monetary performance obligation
to a group of people. Social rights often include the right to healthcare, to
food, and to decent living conditions. On the other hand, civil rights are
generally legal rights: the right to life, to be free from cruel and unusual
treatment and torture etc. It appears that positive rights are yet to receive
full recognition under s. 7 because they are seen as different in nature
from negative rights: they are seen as socio-economic as opposed to civil.
At the moment, there is a lingering controversy over the extent to which
s. 7 covers socio economic rights, but there is an undeniable inclination
among courts and scholars to recognize that the right to life and security
of the person can in fact be breached by the failure of the state to ensure
socio economic rights such as food, shelter, and health care, at least in
some circumstances.171
Regardless of whether courts will include socio economic rights under
s. 7 in the future, the controversy should not extend to the positive rights
that matter in the prison context. A prisoner's positive rights are not socio-
economic. In the prison context, the right to health care and to appropriate
living conditions is closer to a civil right than to a social right, as the
state's initial act of incarceration led to the lack of access to health care.
A prisoner is taken under the full control of the state and he is (by law)
deprived of any meaningful choice or opportunity to ensure his health or
subsistence needs. In such a context, the failure of the state to provide
health care equals a death sentence. The prisoner, once deprived of any
autonomy by incarceration, has little use for the right to have the state not
otherwise intrude in his life. Thus, the state must ensure that it has rules
and procedures in place that provide for adequate health care, food, and
accommodation, in accordance with the realities faced by the individual at
his particular stage in life.
Young has argued that "choice of medical treatment should be treated
as a fundamental right to autonomous decision-making" and thus protected
170. Gosselin, supra note 78.
171. Jackman, supra note 73; Sylvestre, supra note 73; Young, "Social Justice," supra note 73.
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under s. 7.172 With Chaoulli, PHS, and Carter, it appears that the court has
done just that. It would be counterintuitive, to say the least, if the Charter
were to protect the choice of medical treatment without also ensuring the
positive obligation of the state to provide appropriate medical treatment in
situations where autonomous decision-making is completely negated by
incarceration.
c. Principles offundamental justice
As discussed above, a deprivation of life, liberty, and security of the person
constitutes a s. 7 breach only if the deprivation is also not in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.
For legislative sources
Carter,1 73 Bedford,1 7 ' and PHS17  are particularly useful decisions in
illustrating the application of the purpose-based principles of fundamental
justice. The principles prohibiting arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross
disproportionality have been deemed the main substantive principles of
fundamental justice. All three of these principles engage with the objective
of the law under review, and the first step in this analysis is to identify the
objective or the purpose of the law.176
Moriarity provides significant guidance when it comes to identifying
the objective of a law. From the outset, the search for the law's objective
must focus on the ends of the law, rather than the means chosen by the
legislature. Nonetheless, the effects, which are essentially the means
through which the objective is fulfilled, must also be identified, because the
principle of fundamental justice analysis is concerned with a disconnect
between the objective and the effects.177 The objective can be identified
by looking at the legislative text, the context in which it was rendered,
legislative history, and judicial interpretation.17 1 The objective should be
framed in terms that are precise and concise, not too broad and not too
172. Alan Young, "Deprivations of Liberty: The Impact of the Charter on Substantive Criminal Law,"
in Berger& Stribopoulos, supra note 50, 105-143, at 113.
173. Carter, supra note 9.
174. Bedford, supra note 9; Bedford CA, supra note 87. Both the CA and the SCC found the
principle against gross disproportionality and overbreadth to be violated. However, they balanced
different elements to reach that conclusion. For an in-depth analyses of the different elements, see
Hamish Stewart, "Bedford v. Canada: Prostitution and Fundamental Justice," (2011) 57 Crim LQ
197 [Stewart]; Hamish Stewart, "Bedford and the Structure of Section 7," (2015) 60:3 McGill U 575
[Stewart, "Bedford"].
175. PHS, supra note 8.
176. Carter, supra note 9 at para 73; Bedford, supra note 9 at para 123.
177. Moriarity, supra note 89 at paras 24-25.
178. KRJ, supra note 89 at para 64.
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narrow. 179 At this stage of the analysis, the effectiveness of the measures
taken or the wisdom of the objective are not of concern to the court; the
purpose of the legislation is taken at face value and the focus is on how
the effects of the law are connected to its goals. Other considerations that
might justify the means used, such as broader moral values, or social
and public interests are also not brought in at this stage. Instead they are
analyzed under s. 1.180
To establish why certain measures are being adopted as part of the
correctional governmental policy, I have looked at the CCRA, as the act
which delegated regulatory power to CSC, and at the explanation found in
each particular CSC document. While each policy rests on slightly different
reasoning, the overarching purpose behind any kind of correctional
regulation is, according to the CRRA, to carry out sentences in a safe
and humane manner and to help with the rehabilitation and community
reintegration of offenders."' We can infer that each correctional policy
would serve at least one of these purposes, in addition to other potential
purposes.
Directives pertaining to the use ofsegregation
The Discipline ofInmates directive states that the goal of the policy is to
encourage inmates to conduct themselves in a manner that promotes the
good order of the penitentiary," through a process that contributed to their
rehabilitation and reintegration, and promoted compliance with prison
rules.182 The Administrative Segregation directive states as a purpose the
maintenance of the safety of staff and prisoners.1 8 3 The Management of
Inmate Self-Injurious Behavior and Suicidal Acts directive makes it its
goal "to ensure the safety of inmates who are self-injurious or suicidal
using the least restrictive measures for the purpose of preserving life and
preventing serious bodily injury, while maintaining the dignity of the
inmate in a safe and secure environment."1 8 4
The goal of disciplinary segregation is thus to help prisoners to
rehabilitate by maintaining order in the institution and furthering
compliance with the rules. This is aligned with the CCRA's overarching
goal of promoting the safe rehabilitation of prisoners. Perhaps disciplinary
179. Carter, supra note 9 at para 76; Moriarity, supra note 89 at para 28; KRJ, supra note 89 at para
63.
180. R v Swain, (1991) 1 SCR 933 at 977; Carter, supra note 9 at para 79; Moriarity, supra note 89 at
para 30.
181. CCRA, supra note 1, s 3.
182. CD 580, supra note 121.
183. CD 707, supra note 123.
184. CD 843, supra note 120.
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confinement may further rehabilitation for most prisoners who are not
mentally ill; however, the directive also applies to mentally ill prisoners,
who respond differently to solitary confinement. These methods have
no therapeutic value in such cases. Rather, they may perpetuate a cycle
of mental illness, and actually prevent the individual from healing and
rehabilitating.18
When discussing the purpose of the prohibition on assisted suicide,
the court in Carter found the law overbroad because "the effects [of the
law] support the objective in a general way, but it takes away rights that
bear no relationship to the objective."1 8 6 Thus, because this directive is
used to discipline mentally ill prisoners, who are more strongly affected by
solitary confinement and other disciplinary tools than heathier prisoners,
the directive breaches rights in a wider manner than initially contemplated.
The problem is not that the discipline of mentally ill prisoners does not lead
to their rehabilitation, because the effectiveness of the means cannot be
considered at this stage of the analysis."' The problem is that, quite apart
from the fact that these measures fail to support their rehabilitation, there
is a negative impact on the well-being of individuals with mental illness
when they are subject to disciplinary measures created for those without
mental illness. The rights of prisoners with mental illness are affected "in
manner not connected to the mischief contemplated by the legislature.""'
The provisions are thus overbroad.
Administrative segregation is used to ensure the safety of the
institution, and thereby a proper rehabilitative environment. According
to my study, however, this type of segregation is disproportionately
used to contain mentally ill prisoners. To the extent to which mentally
ill prisoners may be restless and create issues within the institution, this
could be a valid reason, but the validity of an objective is irrelevant to the
s. 7 analysis.1 8 9 What does matter is that an individual's mental health is
significantly affected by the used of solitary confinement.1 9 0 Furthermore,
when prisoners whose mental status has deteriorated are returned to
the general population, their behavior is likely to be worse rather than
better. Hence, as the study shows, they will then have to be put back in
solitary confinement. In such situations, the safety of the institution is only
185. See, e.g., Iftene, "Unlocking the Doors," supra note 22.
186. Carter, supra note 9 at para 85.
187. Moriarity supra note 89 at para 30.
188. Carter, supra note 9 at para 85.
189. Moriarity, supra note 89 at para 30.
190. See above, and also see Ivan Zinger, Cherami Wichmann & DA Andrews, "The Psychological
Effects of 60 Days in Administrative Segregation" (2001) 43:1 Can J Crim 47 [Zinger et al].
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temporarily ensured, the rights of mentally ill prisoners are breached, and
the institution becomes an unsafe place over the long term. Seen alongside
the negative impact on prisoners' rights, this shows that "the impact is out
of sync"191 with the goals of the directive, meaning that the directive is
likely both overbroad and grossly disproportionate.
Finally, solitary confinement is meant to ensure the safety of
individuals pre-disposed to self-harm, according to the Management of
Self-Injurious Behavior Directive. The reality, however, is that most of the
people who self-harm are mentally ill and their mental illness is likely to
increase in solitary confinement.1 9 2 It may be that in the short term these
individuals are safe because they cannot harm themselves,1 9 3 but they are
placed at risk by the long-term effects of solitary confinement on mentally
ill people. Because the effects of the document directing that self-injurious
prisoners be placed in segregation has a strong negative effect on their
mental health, the provisions are grossly disproportionate in that their
long-term injurious effects go well beyond the benefits of temporarily
shielding them from self-harm.
Food directives and standing operating procedures
The stated purpose of the Food Services directives and procedures
is to "provide direction for the delivery of quality food services to the
institutions of the Correctional Service of Canada and set guidelines for
the contribution of Food Services to institutional programs and activities,"
but I believe this purpose to be too narrowly defined.1 9 4 Carter has warned
against defining an objective too narrowly by essentially reiterating the
words in the documents.19 5 Similarly, Moriarity rejected a narrow purpose
for the prosecution of civil offences in military personnel in favour of
framing their objective in a way that relates more closely to the larger
goals of military service.1 9 6
Looking at the goals of the CCRAl9 7 and CSC's priorities,1 9 8 it is better
to say that the purpose is to "provide humane custody and supervision to
191. Carter, supra note 9 at para 89.
192. See Iftene, "Unlocking the Doors," supra note 22.
193. The short-term safety of suicidal individuals placed in solitary confinement is questionable.
There have been incidents of suicide committed while on suicide watch, the most notorious being
Ashley Smith. See OCI, "Ashley Smith," supra note 27. The effectiveness of a measure is, however,
beyond the scope of the principles of fundamental justice analysis.
194. CD 880, supra note 131.
195. Carter, supra note 9 at para 76; Moriarity, supra note 89 at para 28.
196. Moriarity, supra note 89 at para 48.
197. CCRA, supra note 1, s 3.
198. Correctional Service Canada, "Our Priorities," online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/about-us/006-
0002-eng.shtml>.
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offenders," and quality food is a means to that end. However, a "one-size-
fits all" medical diet, with little to no nutritional value, cannot be described
as quality food, and it forces prisoners to eat the regular, more filling
food which may harm them. It can be argued that the potential effects of
a uniform medical diet are disconnected from the purpose of providing
"humane custody"199 and that the provisions are arbitrary.
Drug Formulary and Essential Healthcare Framework
Two frameworks elaborate on the medical services and medication that
are generally available to federally incarcerated prisoners if prescribed
by a medical practitioner and, in some cases, if they are also approved
by the warden at his discretion. The Essential Healthcare Framework
prohibits outright a whole set of medical devices and items, widely used in
the community to manage chronic pain and disability, such as orthopedic
mattresses, pillows, orthopedic shoes, etc. The Drug Formulary, by
exhaustively listing the medication available, limits the range of painkillers
to essentially Tylenol 3.
The Essential Healthcare Framework, in its preamble, discusses
the purpose of the two documents. It states that this document exists in
furtherance of CSC's mandate to "provide every inmate with essential
healthcare and reasonable access to non-essential mental health care."
It provides that the purpose of the policy is "to promote quality and
consistency in health services across the country and allows CSC to
make decisions based on monitoring and analyzing the effectiveness and
efficiency of essential health services."200
However, based on the Carter framework,20 1 this stated "purpose" is
in fact a means for attaining a larger objective. Considering the goals set
out in the CCRA,202 as well as the CSC's stated mission "to encourage
individual responsibility, promote healthy reintegration, and contribute
to safe communities,"203 it seems rather that the purpose of the essential
healthcare regulation is to ensure that individuals in CSC charge are
given the means to a healthy rehabilitation and reintegration back into
the community. The uniform regulation of health services is the means
through which this larger objective is achieved.
199. Carter, supra note 9 at para 83 defined arbitrariness as the disconnectionbetween the effects and
the purpose of a law. See also Bedford, supra note 9 at para 111.
200. CSC, Healthcare Framework, supra note 137 at 1.
201. Carter, supra note 9 at para 76.
202. CCRA, supra note 1, s 3.
203. CSC, Healthcare Framework, supra note 137 at 1.
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It is difficult to see how the objective of healthy rehabilitation is being
served by restricting access to medical items and medication that can help
manage chronic conditions. Social science data from this study shows that
people whose conditions are inappropriately addressed tend to have more
disciplinary incidents, and this is clearly not conducive to rehabilitation.
This non-management of chronic conditions is disconnected from the
purpose of rehabilitating and reintegrating individuals, which means that
the frameworks limiting access to medical items are arbitrary.
There might no doubt be larger societal interests or benefits to the
public that might justify limits on the available healthcare, or, in the case
of the Food Services directive, on the diets served. However, this analysis
is not conducted at the principles of fundamental justice level. Rather, it is
conducted at the justification of the breach level, under s. 1.204
For non-legislative state conduct
A warden's decisions to withhold medical items needed by prisoners or a
regional director's decision to limit the number of professionals, as well
as prison practices that force prisoners to stand outdoors to pick up their
medication, are non-legislative state actions.
As previously explained, the current jurisprudence makes it somewhat
unclear whether the courts would feel compelled to identify a principle of
fundamental justice in the case of a breach by state conduct, or whether
they would simply balance the effects of the decision against the rights of
the accused. While courts have sometimes maintained the need to identify
a principle,2 0 5 there are a considerable number of examples to the contrary.
In these cases, the courts have simply looked at the breaches that occurred,
reiterated the rights at issue, and reviewed the conduct and its effects,206
focusing on societal considerations that are more common in an analysis
under s. 1 than under s. 7.207
Based on a free balancing analysis, courts should have no difficulty
concluding that, for instance, the decision to limit medical personnel has
devastating effects on the lives of older prisoners. However, as I describe
below, the outcome of a s. 1 analysis in s. 7 cases is still an "unknown"
due to the little jurisprudence on the matter. The outcome of a s. 7 free
204. Swain, supra note 180 at 977; Carter, supra note 9 at para 79; Moriarity, supra note 89 at para
30.
205. PHS, supra note 9 at paras 129-136.
206. See, e.g., Suresh, supra note 63 at paras 54-75; Burns, supra note 54 at paras 85-124; Khadr
supra note 167 at paras 22-26.
207. See for instance Lake v Canada (Minister ofJustice) [2008] 1 SCR 761 at para 40; Canada
(Justice) v Fischbacher, [2009] 3 SCR 170 at para 39.
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balancing exercise in state-action based violations, which appear to
involve s. 1 elements, is equally difficult to predict.
d. Section ]
Once a legislative provision has been found to breach a Charter right, the
state is given the opportunity, according to s. 1 of the Charter, to prove
that the breach was justified by showing that the provisions in question
are in furtherance of a pressing objective, and that the means chosen
were proportional to that objective. To evaluate the justification provided,
courts apply the Oakes framework: they first assess the importance of the
objective and then they inquire into the proportionality of the law. At this
second stage, courts evaluate whether the means chosen are rationally
connected to the objective of the law, whether they minimally impair
the right in question, and whether there is proportionality between the
deleterious and salutary effects of the law.208
Section 1 has proven to be of limited application once a violation of
s. 7 rights has been found. Section 1 essentially allows for an inquiry into
competing social interests, and because s. 7 rights are fundamental, it is
difficult to reach the conclusion that competing social interests can override
them.209 What is more, the principle of fundamental justice analysis, which
is an integral part of s. 7, partially overlaps with s. 1 analysis. Bedford held
that it will be difficult to justify a law "that runs afoul of the principles of
fundamental justice and is thus inherently flawed."210
More recently, however, Carter and KRJ held that there is a limited
number of circumstances where the state will be able to provide justification
for a s. 7 breach. In particular, the principles of fundamental justice
analysis does not contain a public good inquiry,211 while s. 1 allows for a
"normative and contextual balancing of the interests of society with those
of the groups in question."212 Subsequently, inMichaud, the Ontario Court
of Appeal found a s. 1 justification for a s. 7 violation, though it occurred
in a very different context from the one analyzed here.213 Nonetheless,
these cases suggest that, from now on, the proportionality test in s. 1, and
in particular the weighing of the deleterious and salutary effects of a law,
may be of use to the state.
208. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103.
209. MVR, supra note 53 at 518; G(J), supra note 55 atpara 99; Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 66.
210. Bedford, supra note 9 at para 96.
211. Carter, supra note 9 at para 95.
212. KRJ, supra note 89 at para 139.
213. R. v. Michaud, 2015 ONCA 585 atparas 81-145.
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Section 1 only applies to legislation.2 1 4 Thus, in cases where the senior
officials' decisions or pison practices are found unconstitutional, Canada
will never be able to justify them under s. 1.215 However, considering that
the directives and certain prison frameworks are for all purposes legislative
in effect, the state may attempt a s. 1 justification in those cases.
It is difficult to predict what arguments the CSC would advance to
justify their policies, or how successful these arguments would be. The
CSC often responds to policy criticism from the Office of the Correctional
Investigator by flatly denying that their practices are flawed, without
offering any concrete justification. When they do provide justifications,
these revolve around security concerns and budgetary restrictions. CSC
often offers a blanket justification, stating that, based on their assessment
and using the resources at their disposal, their methods were the best to
fulfill CSC's mission.2 16
The CSC has often been criticized for its extended use of administrative
segregation and for employing it to manage mentally ill prisoners,
practices which are sanctioned by a host of Commissioner's Directives. 217
CSC would likely allege that certain individuals cannot be managed in the
general population and that for their own safety and that of other prisoners,
they need to be isolated, sometimes for very long times, whether or not
they are mentally ill. While such policies may have a pressing objective
(namely that of ensuring the safety of the institution), there is an argument
to be made that the means chosen are not proportionate. On one hand,
these measure more than minimally impair the rights they affect, and on
the other, their salutary effects are not greater than the deleterious ones.
This study shows that both administrative and disciplinary segregation are
disproportionately used on individuals who are physically and mentally
ill, while other studies have shown that segregation has no therapeutic
value, that it increases mental deterioration, and that it leads to a high
214. Charter supra note 5, s 1.
215. However, as mentioned above, the analysis at the principles of fundamental justice stage of a
s. 7 claim involving a breach caused by state conduct appears to involve a free balancing exercise
which implicates societal interest considerations akin to those followed in a s 1 analysis. Thus, even
if reviewed at different stages in the analyses, there are similarities between the issues at play in both
legislation- and state-conduct-based claims.
216. See, e.g., Correctional Service Canada, "Response of the CSC to the 39th Annual report of
the Correctional Investigator"; Correctional Service Canada, "Response of the Correctional Service
of Canada to the 38th Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator 2010-2011," online: <http://
www.csc-scc.gc.ca/publications/cilO-11/index-eng.shtml>. All responses to the OCI's reports follow
similar pattern, and they are available at <www.csc-css.gc.ca>.
217. CD 707, supra note 123; CD 843, supra note 120; CD 580, supra note 121.
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rate of suicide attempts.218 Thus, upon return to the general population,
individuals who have been held in segregation will be even sicker and even
more unstable.219 What these individuals need is access to psychiatric care
and treatment, either in the institution, in the Regional Treatment Centre,220
or in a community hospital. These options, which are both more humane
and more effective in the long term, are in fact available. Considering the
devastating effects of segregation on the mentally ill, policies that subject
them to the practice do not minimally impair their rights. Also, because
the positive "managing" effects are temporary, these individuals may
be rendered even more unstable over the long term, putting the salutary
effects out of all proportion to the deleterious ones.
The second policy CSC might try to justify is their limitation on
medical items and pain medication as per the Essential Healthcare
Framework22 1 and National Drug Formulary.22 2 When it comes to limiting
access to drugs, the number one justification is likely also security. It often
happens that drugs are stolen and trafficked in prison, and the availability
of strong narcotics would fuel these practices. However, the study
suggested that senior inmates, who are highly affected by these practices,
in fact have much shorter lists of disciplinary charges as well as good
relations with staff members. For example, since turning 50, only 310%
of the inmates interviewed reported a disciplinary charge, with only 6%
of these charges being for violent behavior. On the other hand, only 6.1 %
reported poor relations with staff members. Thus, for this particular group,
a drop in security in favor of holistic palliative care or a more permissive
drug policy should not be too difficult to arrange. One could imagine the
creation of seniors-only units, where security concerns would be lower,
and where a better drug policy could be in place. It thus cannot be said
that a blanket prohibition on medically necessary drugs is only minimally
impairing elderly prisoners' rights.
Finally, a potential justification that CSC might offer for its practice
of withholding medical items, drugs, and tailored medical diets, would
revolve around budgetary restrictions. However, it has never been accepted
in Canada that the state can save money at a direct cost to people's well-
218. Zinger et al, supra note 189; Sapers, OCI, 2014-2015, supra note 3 at 25-31; OCI, "Ashley
Smith," supra note 27.
219. See Iftene, "Elderly Inmates," supra note 111 at 171-175.
220. Regional Treatment Centres are CSC Institutions where prisoners with acute mental illnesses
are treated. There is one in every region and most of them are accredited psychiatric facilities. For a
general description, see Correctional Service Canada, Institutional Profiles, online: <http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/institutions/index-eng.shtml>.
221. CSC, Healthcare Framework, supra note 137.
222. CSC, Formulary, supra note 139.
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being and safety. A financial justification has only once been accepted
under s. 1, and that was in a very different context.2 2 3 It is doubtful that any
court would justify threats to life and security of the person because the
government is facing budgetary restrictions.
All this allows the conclusion that while the state may attempt to justify
prima facie unconstitutional legislative policies as the best way to ensure
security based on the resources available, they may not be successful. The
extreme effects of such polices, at least on older individuals, combined
with the availability of better solutions to achieve the same results, would
make such justifications unfeasible.
e. Summary
There are a number of issues that could endanger the life and security of
the person with regards to older prisoners, including the use of segregation
for mentally ill prisoners; the insufficient number of medical personnel, in
particular mental health specialists; a lack of appropriate medical diets;
restricted availability or lack of medical supplies for those suffering from
disabilities; and limited medication opinions for chronic pain.
These breaches are caused by practices specifically requested
or sanctioned by administrative documents or decisions, such as
Commissioner's Directives, Standing Operating Procedures, or wardens'
decisions. The directives apply in prison with the force of law and they
should be reviewed under s. 7 in the same way as policy-creating legislation
is currently reviewed. Administrative decisions and prison practices
should be reviewable as state conduct. Moreover, based on the available
empirical data, the breaches of rights caused by legislative policies are not
in accordance with the purpose-based principles of fundamental justice,
namely arbitrariness, gross disproportionality, and overbreadth. Equally,
it is unlikely that these policies could be justified by the state under s. 1.
It is my contention that the above claims, whether together or separate,
could provide the basis of a successful constitutional challenge under
s. 7 of the Charter. The ability to prove a systemic problem will make for
a stronger claim in an individual case, and it will allow for remedies that
transcend the particular claimant.
223. Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 2004 SCC 66. It is also worth noting that in Gordon
v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625 at para 316, the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted an
economic justification under its s 1 analysis in respect ofwage-restraint legislation. However, this was
done in an obiter passage. The majority found no s 2(d) breach.
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IV. Conclusion: The contribution ofa cuccessful s. 7 Charter argument
to an age-sensitive prison environment
The issues presented by this study fit under the umbrella of a number of
Charter challenges, especially those based on the right to life and security
of the person. The aim ofthis article has been to show that a s. 7 argument is
feasible. While in the past many Charter challenges were as unsuccessful
as other types of prison litigation, the empirical data available should help
to build stronger arguments in favor of enhanced protection of the rights
of elderly prisoner. The application of s. 7 itself has known significant
jurisprudential expansion in recent years, and the willingness of courts to
apply s. 7 to policy matters, to rely on empirical data in order to establish
corresponding deprivations and breaches of the principles of fundamental
justice, and to consider positive rights under this section, renders a s. 7
challenge of prison procedures significantly more likely to succeed.
That being said, bringing the type of claim proposed here will not
be easy. It will require prisoners willing to sue the government, and they
will need access to legal advice and support to do so. Litigation is also
expensive, and there is a lot at stake for claimants in a case like this.2 2 4
However, in the absence of other viable options (which is owed in large
part to the failure of legislators and governments to address these matters
voluntarily) and in view of the increase in older prisoners with declining
health, such claims will eventually arise. Moreover, courts have allowed
for public standing in Charter challenges to unconstitutional legislative
provisions,22 and in such cases a prisoner claimant would not even be
needed. While views on this are conflicting, public standing may also be
allowed for challenges to state conduct.2 2 6 It will then be up to courts to
seize the opportunity and require the government to fulfill its constitutional
duties towards its most vulnerable populations.
When s. 7 violations occur as a result of state conduct, remedies will
generally be granted under s. 24, whereas when it results from a legislative
violation, remedies under s. 52 apply.2 2 7 It is sometimes considered that
224. For the barriers faced by prisoner litigants see Parkes, supra note 41 at 667.
225. Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers UnitedAgainst iolence Society,
2012 SCC 45 at para 51. BCCLA, supra note 5.
226. In Chaudhary v Attorney General of Canada et al, 22010 ONSC 6092 at paras 19-25, the judge
specifically expressed his uncertainty regarding the application of public standing to cases where
s 24 remedies are sought (thus cases where state conduct is at issue); however, in Conseil scolaire
francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v British Columbia (Education), 2016 BCSC 1764 at paras
1123-1131, the judge allowed public standing for individuals seeking s 24 remedies. Public standing
was granted to the BC Civil Liberties Association and the John Howard Society by BCSC in a prison
case currently being heard in court, challenging the use of segregation
227. GVT, supra note 71 at para 87.
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only s. 52 remedies have the potential for systemic effects. 228 For instance,
a finding that the CD allowing the use of segregation for mentally ill
people or the framework banning medical items needed by older people is
unconstitutional would force CSC to redraft these documents. This would
benefit all individuals affected by the policies they contain.
However, courts have proven that they are able and willing to provide
creative remedies under s. 24(1) that go beyond the claimant. 229 We can
thus imagine how a court might use the opportunity of a Charter challenge
to prison practices to further systemic change in Canada's prison. For
example, if the court finds that the decision to limit the hiring of medical
personnel is unconstitutional, it could order CSC to employ more mental
health specialists, based for instance on community standards. As Roach
has argued, there is no reason courts cannot grant positive remedies under
the Charter.23 0
Finally, even if courts are not willing to provide a positive remedy, a
mere recognition-as through a declaration under either s. 24 or s. 52-
that a practice or directive violates Charter rights could go a long way
towards pushing the matter onto legislators' tables.
228. Ibid at para 88.
229. The most notable case is Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister ofEducation), 2003 SCC 62.
230. Kent Roach, "The Courts and Medicare: Too Much or Too Little Judicial Activism?" in Colleen
Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, Access to care, access to justice: the legal debate over private
health insurance in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) at 184-201.

